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The marital relation constitutes the basic foundation of American society.
Marriage blends intimacy and publicity. It shapes the manner in which
individuals perceive themselves and the way in which they are viewed by
others. Because marriage is strictly regulated by the state,1 it carries an
inherent tension between the relational autonomy of the individual and the state
interest in sanctioning relationships. This tension is illustrated in the current
national debate on the legitimacy of same-sex marriages.
Issues at the heart of the same-sex marriage debate include morality, the
right of privacy, and equal protection of the laws. The state and the individual
have strong, yet conflicting interests in each of these areas that must be
resolved by any litigation strategy promising success for state recognition of
same-sex unions. This Note presents an analysis of these issues and a proposal
for balancing them to achieve state recognition of same-sex marriages. Under
current federal jurisprudence, the right of privacy does not create a right to
engage in same-sex marriage. Equal protection, however, presents a compelling
legal argument for recognizing same-sex unions. Ultimately, a state equal
rights amendment prohibiting discrimination based on sex is the most
promising basis for recognition of a right of same-sex marriage.2
This Note reviews the case for same-sex marriage through the lens of state
constitutional law. The state law context is particularly appropriate in this era
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1. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376
(1971).
2. Currently, seventeen states have provisions in their state constitutions that prohibit some form
of discrimination based upon sex. These states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. California and Louisiana offer only
limited protection from sex-based discrimination, however. California's guarantee is limited to the
business context. CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 8. Louisiana protects its citizens only from "arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination" based upon sex. LA. CoNsT. art. I § 12. See infra
note 125.
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of new judicial federalism in which state legal sources promise new success for
civil rights and civil liberties litigation. This Note identifies the factors relevant
to a state's likelihood of recognizing same-sex marriages. 3 These factors
include the absence of a sodomy statute, a privacy amendment in the state
constitution, an equal rights amendment in the state constitution, an individual-
istic or moralistic political culture, an activist legal culture, a diverse
population, and the absence of a process for state constitutional amendment by
direct citizen initiative. An ideal state in which to challenge a prohibition on
same-sex marriage would have a combination of these elements.
A review of the current obstacles faced by same-sex partners and an
analysis of modem equal protection doctrine will establish the above factors as
relevant to a successful challenge of state proscription of same-sex marriages.
Part I of the Note reviews the current legal status of same-sex unions in our
society. Part II identifies recent societal changes which indicate an increased
likelihood of public and judicial approval of marriages between same-sex
partners.4 Part III analyzes the possible dangers inherent in anchoring a right
of same-sex marriage to a state constitutional provision. Part IV examines past
federal claims which failed to achieve a recognition of same-sex marriage, as
well as recent opinions suggesting new promise for same-sex unions.5 Part V
analyzes equal protection doctrine and its applicability to challenges against the
proscription of same-sex marriage. Part VI discusses the national significance
of state approval of same-sex marriage and targets future sites for litigation.
Through this analysis, it becomes clear that societal changes in the perception
of both the individual and the government hold promise for the eventual
recognition of same-sex marriages in the states.
3. For a similar discussion targeting other states likely to recognize same-sex marriage, but
measuring very different factors of import and reaching different conclusions, see Brown, infra note
209, at 818-33. Brown names Hawaii, Nevada, and Vermont as states likely to recognize same-sex
unions. Id.
4. The two most important developments increasing the likelihood of state recognition of same-sex
marriages are the AIDS crisis and the new judicial federalism movement. See NATIONAL RESEARCH
CoUNcIL, THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 219-38 (1993); William J. Brennan,
Jr., Guardians of Our Liberties - State Courts No Less Than Federal, in ViEws FROM THE BENCH:
THE JUDICIARY AND CONSITUTIONAL POLITICS 229 (Mark W. Cannon & David M. O'Brien eds.,
1985); ChristineM. Durham, Obligation orPower? The NewJudicialFederaismandthePofcy-Making
Role of State Supreme Courts, 1989 EMERGING IssUES IN STATE CONST. L. 219; A.E. Dick Howard,
The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1988 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 1.
5. The most common federal claim made against the proscription of same-sex marriages was that
marriage was a fundamental right and, therefore, its denial violated constitutional rights of privacy and
due process. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 185




I. THE CURRENT STATE OF SAME-SEX UNIONS:
THE NECESSITY OF STABILITY
In the absence of a right to marriage, gay and lesbian couples manipulate
existing law to gain the legal benefits and stability awarded to married persons.
Two methods currently used are adult adoption and contract.' Additionally,
gay rights activists have met with some success in recent years with the passage
of domestic partnerships. These methods incur tremendous transaction costs
and fail to produce the complete range of benefits that stem from the legally
recognized union of marriage. When upheld by courts, however, they
demonstrate an evolution in judicial treatment of gay couples.
Some gay couples have resorted to adult adoption to establish legal
recognition of their family. Numerous jurisdictions define adoption as a "legal
proceeding whereby a person takes another person into the relation of child and
thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of parent in respect
of such other person."' However, not all states require that the adoptee be a
minor. For gay couples, the primary legal goal of adoptions is to provide an
avenue for legal inheritance. The gay partner with inheritable property adopts
his partner in order to assure that the partner will inherit his wealth upon his
death. In addition, "[v]ery often, the parties to adult adoption express their
desire to legally formalize their personal commitment to each other."8
Not all jurisdictions equally recognize adult adoption. Only New York has
addressed the quasi-marital aspects of such adoptions. The New York Court of
Appeals has concluded that the sexual nature of such relationships is in
opposition with the commonly understood parental function of adoption.9
"Where the relationship between the adult parties is utterly incompatible with
the creation of a parent-child relationship between them, the adoption process
is not the proper vehicle by which to formalize their partnership in the eyes of
the law." 10 Subsequent lower court rulings have, however, circumvented the
decision of the Court of Appeals by holding that adult adoptions may stand
where economic concerns are a primary motivation for such adoption." In
three cases, lower courts in the state of New York have upheld adult adoptions
for inheritance purposes between gay life partners. 2
6. See Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Famiy, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
681,688-97 (1990).
7. Id. at 688-89 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1988)). Arkansas, New York,
and North Dakota expressly allow adult adoption. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-203 (1987); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW §§ 109, 110 (McKinney 1988); and N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-02 (1981).
8. Zimmer, supra note 6, at 689.
9. In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984).
10. Id. at 439.
11. 333 E. 53rd Street Assoc. v. Mann, 503 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1986).
12. Zimmer, supra note 14, at 690.
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Adult adoption signifies the commitment between same-sex partners, but
does not achieve the full scope of legal rights in marriage. 13 Adoption creates
a more permanent commitment than modem marriage because no mechanism
exists for dissolution of adoption.14 In addition, the adopter/adoptee relation-
ship assigns each partner different legal rights and responsibilities, unlike the
equal commitment created by marriage.
Same-sex couples also use contract law to signify their commitment and
establish binding rights. Carefully constructed contracts that obey all
requirements of state statutes and judicial precedents can establish rights and
responsibilities between same-sex cohabitators. Contracts are primarily used to
distribute property upon dissolution of the relationship. Contracts can also
establish support guidelines, assign responsibility for medical decision-making,
and be of use in estate planning. 5 Although traditional legal doctrine
disallowed contracting between parties engaging in sexual relations as a matter
of public policy,16 this policy has been abandoned so long as sexual conduct
is not referred to specifically." However, legal planning required to create
enforceable contracts between same-sex partners is time-consuming and
expensive and therefore is not an adequate substitution for the default rights
created between married persons.
In recent years, domestic partnerships have extended government
recognition to same-sex unions. These ordinances allow nonmarried city
employees who reside with a significant other of either sex to provide their
partner with the same rights to health benefits, hospital visitation, sick leave,
bereavement leave, property and life insurance, and annuity and pension rights
as those enjoyed by married employees. 8 The requirements for domestic
partner status tend to be more exacting than the requirements for marriage.19
Although domestic partnership laws are growing in number, they exist only at
the municipal level in metropolitan areas and offer limited legal benefits.
The recognition of adult adoption, contract, and domestic partnership in
establishing rights for gay life partners is evidence of an increased willingness
13. Id. at 691.
14. Id. at 692.
15. Id. at 695.
16. Such was interpreted as consideration, thereby rendering the agreement unenforceable as a
matter of public policy. See, e.g., Updeck v. Samuel, 266 P.2d 822 (Cal. 1964); Hill v. Estate of
Westbrook, 213 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1950).
17. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), upheld cohabitation agreements between
nonmarried couples, recognizing that, in light of changing standards of morality, "adults who voluntarily
live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract
respecting their earnings and property rights." Id. at 116. Where a "meretricious" relationship is not
the sole consideration for the agreement, remedies under express or implied contract may be awarded.
Id. at 122.
18. See Zimmer, supra note 6, at 693.





of judges to find protection for homosexual relationships in the law. The
difficulties faced by same-sex partners in using these avenues to achieve
recognition and stability for their unions suggest that a policy change is
necessary. The time for an analysis of methods most likely to achieve equality
under law for same-sex unions is at hand.
H. PROMISING SocIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Two recent changes in American society, one primarily social and the other
primarily political, indicate promise for future recognition of same-sex unions
in the states. The first is a more open attitude toward relationships between
persons of the same sex that stems from a desire to foster stability in
interpersonal physical relationships.' The second is a national shift in judicial
decision-making that has created unprecedented opportunities for important
civil liberties rulings in state supreme courts. This "New Judicial Federalism"
is part of the federal retrenchment of civil liberties during the Burger and
Rehnquist Court eras." This development, coupled with a greater societal
acceptance of homosexual relationships, may lay the groundwork for successful
state court challenges of denials of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
A. Social Conditions Fostering Eventual Recognition of Same-Sex Unions
Changes in recognition of same-sex unions at the municipal level
demonstrate evolving legislative and judicial attitudes toward homosexuality.
New York City and San Francisco are examples of two cities evidencing a
liberal trend in defining relationships.
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates,22 the New York Court of Appeals held that
the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations entitled the gay lover of a
recently deceased man to protection from eviction.' The regulations provided
that upon the death of a rent-control tenant, the landlord may not dispossess the
surviving spouse or other family member who had been living with the tenant.
The court had to decide whether a gay life partner fit within the ambit of
20. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES
219-38 (1993) [hereinafter SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS]; see also Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise,
HIV-AIDS and the Non-Traditional Family: The Argument for State and Federal Judicial Recognition
of Danish Same-Sex Mariages, 16 NOvA L. REV. 809, 810-11 (1992).
21. See Ronald K. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: State
Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES FOR
POWER AND GOvERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 641-49 (David M. O'Brien ed., 1991) (discussing
general trend of state court interpretation of state materials and methods of integrating state and federal
constitutional law). See generally Priscilla Painton, One Nation, Very Divisible, TIME, Oct. 8, 1990, at
76 (discussing newfound liberalism of state supreme courts in era of federal conservatism in context of
Florida right-to-die case).
22. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
23. New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 2204.6(d) (1984).
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"family." The court took an expansive view of the term, commenting:
[ec]ontrary to all of these arguments, we conclude that the term family... should
not be rigidly restricted to those people who have fbrmalized their relationship by
obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended
protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or
genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life.
In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of
family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and
characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. This
view comports both with our society's traditional concept of 'family' and with the
expectations of the individuals who live in such nuclear units... 24
The Braschi decision must be interpreted within the context of the AIDS
epidemic to understand the court's analysis and final result. As pointed out
in the National Research Council's study, "Braschi's lawyers believed that the
many accounts in newspapers and on television of gay partners taking care of
a partner with AIDS were likely to have made sympathetic impressions on the
judges, impressions that could be helpful as the court decided how expansively
to interpret the term 'family. ' '
In San Francisco, similar changes took place in the willingness to grant
recognition to same-sex relationships; in San Francisco, however, the changes
occurred among the voters rather than the judiciary. Voters approved an
24. Brasehi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d at 53-54.
25. SoCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS, supra note 20, at 232-33. The Braschi case was one of many heard
in New York courts involving the rights of surviving partners of AIDS victims. Many of the cases
involved apartment succession to a same-sex partner after the death of a partner tenant for whom the
claimant cared during the illness. Although Miguel Brasehi sought to keep his partner's long-term illness
out of the case, it was obvious in the court documents that his partner had died of AIDS. The case was
highly publicized and helped dispel stereotypes of gay promiscuity.
26. Id. at 233. Negating the myth of gay promiscuity, a 1991 survey found that 70% of gay women
and 50% of gay men were, in fact, currently involved in long-term, committed relationships. See
Julienne Scocca, Society's Ban On Same-Sex Marriages:A Reevaluation of the So-Called 'Fundamental
Right' ofMarriage, 2 CoNSr. L. J. 719, 720 (1992) (citing Brent Hartinger, A Case for Gay Marriage,
COMMONwEAL, Nov. 22, 1991, at 681). The Braschi decision had a direct legal impact on rights of
same-sex couples in the state of New York. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal issued
new regulations to cover rent control apartments, expanding the category of "relatives" protected from
eviction under rent control to include any persons "who can prove emotional and financial commitment
and interdependence," with the tenant. SOCIAL IMPACr OF AIDS, supra note 20, at 235. The new
guidelines included findings of fact on the AIDS crisis and its effect on homelessness. Many life partners
of individuals who died of AIDS lost their homes upon the deaths of the tenants. Most were forced onto
the streets after having spent extended periods of time caring for their sick mates; many were sick
themselves. The new regulations noted that between 124,000 and 235,000 people in New York had
become infected with AIDS. Of this group, the great majority were gay men or members of low-income
groups. These two groups were most likely to live in nontraditional households and were, therefore, in
peril of losing their homes. rd. at 235. Immediately after Braschi was decided, then-mayor Ed Koch
announced the recognition of domestic partnerships. By executive order, he expanded city employee
bereavement leave policy to include similar leave for same-sex partners as for traditional spouses. Exec.
Order No. 123 (1989) (New York City Mayor Ed Koch) (cited in SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS, supra note
20, at 236. City employees who wished to take advantage of such leave simply had to file the name of
their domestic partner with the city. These policy changes were discussed prior to Braschi, but positive
public response to the decision expedited their implementation. Id.
Vol. 14:237, 1996
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ordinance allowing unmarried persons to register with the city as domestic
partners.27 An introductory section of the ordinance stated that its purpose was
to "create a way to recognize intimate committed relationships, including those
who [sic] are otherwise denied the right to identify the partners with whom
they share their lives."' The eventual passage of the amended ordinance was
the result of eight years of political struggles during which the AIDS crisis
worsened in San Francisco. Despite extensive protest, the ordinance eventually
passed with a wider margin than any other voter initiative on the ballot.29 Yet,
because domestic partnership registration does not provide the same degree of
benefits for same-sex partners as marriage, many viewed the significance of the
ordinance as largely symbolic.3"
As events in New York and San Francisco demonstrate, the AIDS crisis
permitted heterosexual citizens to identify sympathetically with homosexual
committed life partners and encouraged a desire to foster stable, monogamous
heterosexual and homosexual relationships. 3 The desire to foster stable
relationships explains the favorable reception of measures to recognize gay
relationships by the judiciary in New York and the voters in San Francisco. In
addition, due in part to societal recognition of the AIDS crisis, sixteen other
municipalities established mechanisms for registration of domestic partner-
ships.32 Large metropolitan centers promise some potential for recognition for
homosexual unions.
27. Id. at 221.
28. Id. at 227-28.
29. Id. at 229. The AIDS crisis increased the political awareness and participation of gay citizens,
which contributed to the eventual passage of the ordinance. Lesbians and gay men exercised political
clout and strenuously lobbied for the recognition of their rights, where before many had hidden their
orientation and had resorted to adult adoption or contract to obtain legally enforceable rights. Id. at
222-23. AIDS also affected opinions in the heterosexual community. As discussed by the National
Research Council,
For people outside the gay and lesbian communities, AIDS... altered the meaning of the
domestic partnership issue. In San Francisco, many people knew and most had read about gay
men who were providing care for a dying partner. They had heard about and seen pictures
from the 'Names Project,' the quilt pieced from panels commemorating those who died of
AIDS. For many, their image of the gay male community had expanded beyond hedonism to
include tenderness, self-sacrifice, and suffering. With familiarity, they became more
responsive to claims of a need to recognize gay partners than they had been in 1982.
Id. at 223-24.
30. Id.
31. See Closen & Heise, supra note 20, at 810-11.
32. The first domestic partnership ordinance went into effect in Berkeley, California in 1984. Other
cities to pass such ordinances include West Hollywood, California; Los Angeles, California; Laguna
Beach, California; Washington, D.C.; Tacoma Park, Maryland; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Minneapolis,
Minnesota; Ithaca, New York; Seattle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin. In addition, Santa Cruz,
San Mateo, and Alameda Counties in California and Travis County in Texas have extended domestic
partnership benefits to city employees. For a thorough discussion of these city and county domestic
partnership ordinances, including citations and substantive provisions, as well as the policy goals and
general implications of such ordinances, see Craig Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect
Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164
(1992) [hereinafter A More Perfect Union].
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However, municipal domestic partnership ordinances cannot be regarded
as promising national recognition for same-sex relationships in the United
States. A 1989 poll revealed that 69% of Americans disapprove of legal
recognition of homosexual marriage." New York and San Francisco have
large homosexual populations and a disproportionate share of AIDS cases
which forced the population of each municipality to confront issues of same-sex
partnerships.'
Public opinion and political efforts in the nation at large35 indicate that the
judiciary is the best hope for gay couples to achieve marital status. Recent
events in Colorado illustrate this point. In May of 1992, petitions to amend the
Colorado Constitution sparked controversy because they expressly declared that
homosexuality could not serve as the basis of suspect class status in the state.
The proposed amendment was approved by voters in November 1992 by a
margin of 53.4% to 46.6% .1 As passed, the amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
33. Closen & Heise, supra note 20, at 809 (citing Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage
Rights?, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 101).
34. As evidence that not all regions are favorable locations for some form of recognition for
domestic partners, a recent opinion by Georgia's Attorney General declared that municipal ordinances
enacting domestic partnerships would violate the state constitution. The Georgia Constitution in a section
titled "Limitations on special legislation" reads "(a) laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation throughout this state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which
provision has been made by an existing general law ... (c) No special law relating to the rights or
status of private persons shall be enacted." GA. CONSr. art. I, § 6, 4. The Attorney General wrote,
"Municipal ordinances which create the status of domestic partnership are violative of constitutional and
statutory provisions precluding municipal legislation relating to legal status and relationship; thus, group
health insurance coverage provided pursuant to such ordinances is violative of the public policy of this
state." 1993 Op. Atty Gen. No. 93-26.
35. The comparison of cases in same-sex marriage litigation from the 1970s to the 1990s
demonstrates a number of social and legal changes in the way these constitutional challenges are brought
forth and handled by the courts. The most important shift in recent same-sex marriage litigation is the
focus on state courts and state legal materials. This shift is also evidenced more broadly in all political
struggles for gay rights. Fewer lobbying efforts have been directed at the federal government and more
have been aimed at state and local entities. While public opinion has become more accepting of
homosexual lifestyles in certain geographic areas, such acceptance is almost entirely limited to large
urban settings, which tend to be politically distinct from their surrounding environs. Same-sex
relationships, and marriage in particular, are not generally accepted to the extent necessary for
recognition by majoritarian political entities. A recent Newsweek poll found that 53 % of Americans do
not consider homosexuality an acceptable lifestyle and 45% feel that homosexuality is a threat to the
American family. Job Rights for Homosexuals Backed in Poll, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1992, at 10.
Sixty-nine percent of Americans disapprove of legally sanctioned homosexual marriages. See Walter
Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights?, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 102. A more recent poll
disclosed that 56% of Americans oppose maldng same-sex marriages legal. Marriage-The Toughest
Battle Lies Ahead, HUM. RTs. CAMPAIGN Q., Winter 1996, at 16.
36. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994).
Vol. 14:237, 1996
Same-Sex Marriages
claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination.
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.37
The amendment may have far-reaching effects on the lives of homosexuals.
It may make discrimination against gay citizens of Colorado permissible by
prohibiting them from raising the issue of sexual orientation as grounds for
special protection. The passage of this amendment illustrated the power of the
voting public: a small majority enacted a constitutional provision forbidding
certain actions by all of the political branches.
The Colorado Supreme Court declared the amendment unconstitutional. The
court held that measures prohibiting policies and laws designed to eliminate
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation abridged the fundamental right
to participate equally in the political process and were therefore properly
subject to strict scrutiny analysis.38 In so doing, the court asserted that there
were improper methods of advancing moral beliefs.
As this episode suggests, the judiciary may hold the most promise for the
recognition of same-sex marriages given its prescribed role as protector of the
interests of the minority. Robert Burt has commented, "[Tihe outcome of
[majority vs. minority] hostilities cannot legitimately rest on majority rule;
judicial deference to majoritarianism in the context of polarized politics is
inconsistent with the original aspirations of the founders .... -1 Courts have
a greater ability to protect minority interests than the executive and legislative
branches.4°
B. New Judicial Federalism
Legal scholars assert that "a structure is beginning to emerge in which state
supreme courts are interpreting state constitutional provisions more broadly
than the Supreme Court interprets similar federal provisions." 41 The "New
37. Id. (quoting COLO. CONSr. amend. 2 (1992)).
38. The state alleged that even if the Colorado amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, it was per se valid because it was within the sphere of power of Colorado's voters
under the Tenth Amendment. In response to this argument, the Colorado court asserted, "[s]tates have
no compelling interest in amending their constitution in ways that violate fundamental federal rights."
Id. at 1350. The Colorado Supreme Court also explicitly rejected the protection of public morality as
a compelling state interest, id. at 1347, and the defendants' assertions that antidiscrimination laws
actually endorsed homosexual conduct. The court stated, "[wle are of the opinion ... that
antidiscrimination laws make no assumptions about the morality of protected classes-they simply
recognize that certain characteristics, be they moral or immoral-have no relevance in enumerated
commercial contexts." Id. at 1347. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, and
a decision is expected in 1996.
39. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CoNsrTurioN IN CONFLIcT 356 (1992).
40. The importance of the judiciary in attaining recognition for homosexual relationships is
discussed supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
41. Ronald F. Wright, A Post-Webster Reminder About Delegation and Regulation, in ABORTION
AND THE STATES: POLrICAL CHANGE AND FUTURE REGULATION 120 (Jane B. Wishner ed., 1993).
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Judicial Federalism" has increased the likelihood of state recognition of
same-sex marriages. 42
Many constitutional scholars agree that "state constitutional law was ...
eclipsed by the activism of the Warren Court"43 with its expansive interpreta-
tion of federal standards for individual rights. The subsequent Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have retrenched individual liberties granted during the
Warren court era. As explained by David M. O'Brien:
Federal-state court relations... have evolved rather dramatically in the last thirty
years with the changes in the composition and direction of the Supreme Court. In
the 1950s and 1960s, when state supreme courts tended to be much more conser-
vative than the Warren Court, relations were often especially acrimonious ....
By contrast, in the 1970s and 1980s the direction of the Burger and Rehnquist
Court's policymaking moved in more conservative directions, while some state
supreme courts became far more protective of individual rights. Although not
outright reversing some of the most controversial and landmark Warren Court
rulings, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts refused further extensions and achieved
retrenchment in a number of areas. More liberal state supreme courts accordingly
refused to follow the rulings of the Court when interpreting individual rights under
state constitutional law.'
The newfound willingness of state courts to create rights not yet recognized by
the federal government may be the best hope for the recognition of same-sex
marriages.
No federal court has ruled on the issue of same-sex marriage, and in
Bowers v. Hardwick,45 the Burger Court refused to expand the right of
privacy to include homosexual practices, leaving an abyss to be filled by state
courts and state legal sources. Because the Bowers court explicitly refused to
recognize a right for homosexuals to engage in consensual sexual relationships,
federal doctrine offers little promise for same-sex marriage litigation.46 State
42. State courts occasionally disregard Supreme Court decisions, but rarely do they assert
independent grounds for such rulings. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution creates
uniformity in interpretation between federal and state courts. See U.S. CONSr. art. VI. The clause
requires that state courts conform to federal law in all decisions that address federal questions. It does
not dictate, however, that state and federal law must be identical. "So long as the protections embraced
within the state documents do not sink into the quicksand below the firm foundation of federally
protected rights, the states are free to grant their citizens greater civil liberties and civil rights than those
guaranteed by the federal government." Yvonne Kauger, Reflections on Federalism: State Constitutions'
Role As Nurturers of Individual Rights, 1991 EMERGING ISSUES STATE CoNsr. L. 107.
43. Howard, supra note 4, at 6.
44. DAVID M. O'BREIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES FOR POwER AND
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILrrY 628-29 (1991).
45. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy law).
46. But cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (1lth Cir. 1995) (holding Georgia attorney general's
decision to withdraw job offer to female attorney after learning she planned to engage in marriage
ceremony with her lesbian partner was subject to strict scrutiny because it violated federal constitutional
right of intimate association). This case offers some promise of eventual federal recognition of certain
rights for same-sex partners. However, the strict scrutiny applied by the Eleventh Circuit did not relate
directly to the issue of marriage, but to privacy rights in one's personal life and one's employment
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courts are the proper arena for future litigation.
C. The Promise Fulfilled: Evidence of State Court Independence in the
Privacy Context
Two recent state court decisions concerning individual sexual autonomy
demonstrate both the trend in state court independence and the increased
recognition and respect granted to homosexual relationships. Both holdings
were grounded in state legal materials and rejected the result of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Bowers.
In Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Wsson,47 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held that a state statute making illegal "deviate sexual intercourse
with another person of the same sex"48 violated the state constitution's right
of privacy.4 9 The court stated that "the guarantees of individual liberty
provided in our 1891 Kentucky Constitution offer greater protection of the
right of privacy than provided by the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court."5" The proscription of homosexual sodomy was
unconstitutional under the state's right to privacy because "immorality in
private which does not 'operate to the detriment of others,' is placed beyond
the reach of state action by the guarantees of liberty in the Kentucky
Constitution.""'
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, found
that "private sexual conduct between consenting adults is protected from
government regulation or interference by the privacy rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of Tennessee."52 In Campbell v. Sundquist, the court found a
statute making it a crime to "engage in consensual sexual penetration... with
a person of the same gender" to be unconstitutional. 3 The court based its
holding on the "hostility expressed in the Constitution of Tennessee to the
interference with the personal freedoms of the people of this state unless that
opportunities.
47. 842 S.W.2d 487 (1992).
48. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Baldwin 1994).
49. Like the federal right to privacy, the right to privacy in Kentucky is implicit.
50. 842 S.W.2d at 491.
51. Id. at 496. The Commonwealth argued that such activity was immoral and that cultural and
historical traditions supported the proscription. The defendants argued that the right to privacy
outweighed any of these alleged state interests. The Kentucky Supreme Court chastised the state for
asserting that because both the state and federal privacy guarantees are implicit rather than explicit, they
should offer the same degree of liberty protection. The court admonished
Such is not the formulation of federalism... [u]nder our system of dual sovereignty, it is our
responsibility to interpret and apply our state constitution independently. We are not bound
by decisions of the United States Supreme Court when deciding whether a state statute
impermissibly infringes upon individual rights guaranteed in the State Constitution ....
Id. at 492.
52. Campbell v. Sundquist, No. 93C-1547, slip op. at 2-3 (5th Cir. Ct. Tenn. Davidson County,
Feb. 2, 1995) (order granting summary judgment).
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1994).
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interference is absolutely necessary to protect the public welfare."m The court
also explicitly stated that "[i]t is inconsistent with the state constitutional right
of privacy and liberty to prohibit behavior based on majoritarian morality." 55
The Kentucky and Tennessee cases exemplify the growing independence of
state courts in this era of New Judicial Federalism. Few courts have expanded
the sexual autonomy rights of same-sex couples beyond the minimal level of
protection granted by the federal judiciary.5 6 However, these cases demon-
strate the greatly diminished reliance on federal doctrine in some state courts
and a potential unwillingness to conform to the Supreme Court's traditional and
historical interpretation.
The decisions of the Kentucky and Tennessee courts may also suggest a
liberalization of views of same-sex relationships on the state benches. A
litigation strategy reliant on state legal resources may hold promise, given that
the states traditionally have regulated marriage. As stated by the Washington
Supreme Court in Singer v. Hara, "[s]ubject to constitutional limitations, the
state has exclusive dominion over the legal institution of marriage and the state
alone has the 'prerogative of creating and overseeing this important institu-
tion."r Some recent cases hint that marriage may be defined more broadly
under state regulation than at the federal level.
State supreme courts have recognized equal protection claims in the context
of same-sex marriage. One state court in Baehr v. Lewin, 5 has demonstrated
independence in interpreting its state equal rights amendment to guarantee
equality to homosexuals.. In Dean v. District of Columbia,59 a dissenting judge
discussed the equality principle in the context of homosexual rights, promising
greater enforcement of the principle in future litigation. Before analyzing the
evolution in interpretation of the right to marriage and equal protection at the
federal and state level, however, the viability of anchoring legal rights in state
constitutions must be evaluated in light of the ease with which state constitu-
tions can be amended.
III. STATE CONSITUTONAL AMENDMENTS: A HOLE IN THE THEORY?
In the context of this analysis, the ability to amend a state constitution is
important because such action "enables the People to 'overrule' judicial
54. Campbell v. Sundquist, No. 93C-1547, slip op. at 3.
55. Id. This opinion is likely largely the result of regional influence. The Tennessee court relied
on Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992), in refusing to find sufficient justification
for the statute simply because the prohibited conduct was immoral and antimajoritarian. Id. at 6-7.
56. For state opinions which adhere to the degree of sexual autonomy granted to homosexuals at
the federal level, see State v. Neal, 500 So. 2d 374 (La. 1987); Neville v. Kelly, 430 A.2d 570 (Md.
1981); State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
57. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. 1979).
58. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
59. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
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decisions. " ' Before asserting that particular state constitutional provisions
promise recognition for same-sex relationships, the viability of such assertions
must be assessed in light of current majoritarian disapproval of same-sex
61unions.
One of the founding fathers' primary concerns was insulating federal
government operations from majoritarian impulses. 62 Fear of the tyranny of
the majority prompted the drafting of Article V to require approval of a super-
majority of three-fourths of the states for constitutional revision.'
Each state constitution contains its own version of Article V that details
procedures for proposing and ratifying amendments. Amending state
constitutions is a far easier task than amending the U.S. Constitution because
forty-nine states require only a majority of the citizens voting in an election to
ratify an amendment.' In addition, seventeen states allow amendments to
originate with the public, requiring no legislative deliberation on proposals to
60. Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change andDirectDemocracy, 66 U. COO. L. REV. 143,156
(1995).
61. Majoritarian disapproval of homosexual marriages is illustrated by the recent wave of legislation
to ban recognition of same-sex unions in almost every state following the announcement of the Hawaii
Supreme Court's opinion in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). See David W. Dunlap, Fearing
a Toeholdfor Gay Marriages, Conservatives Rush to Bar the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at A13.
However, to date such measures have passed in only four states: Georgia, Idaho, South Dakota, and
Utah. Similar measures have failed in Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Telephone
Interview with Evan Wolfson, Director of Lambda Delta (Apr. 8, 1996).
62. James Madison argued that people must be protected against their own "fickleness and
passion." Madison observed that the majority "might under sudden impulses be tempted to commit
injustice on the minority." Hans Linde, Who Is Responsiblefor Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 709, 720 n.44 (1994) (quoting 4 THE FOuNDER'S CONSrrrulON 123 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
63. Article V requires that proposed amendments to the federal Constitution be approved by two-
thirds of both houses of Congress or by a constitutional convention called by two-thirds of the state
legislatures. Amendments must thus originate in either the federal or state legislatures. A supermajority
of three-fourths of the states is required to ratify an amendment. For a different opinion on the legal
requirements for amending the Constitution, see Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (arguing public can
petition for constitutional convention and voter majority can ratify constitutional amendment).
64. The exception is Delaware, in which an amendment to the Constitution is ratified only if
approved by two-thirds of each house of the legislature in two consecutive sessions, between which the
prospective amendment and the voting record of each member is published. DEL. CONsr. art. XVI, §
1. For a comprehensive tabulation of the methods of amending state constitutions, see 1994-95 THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 21-22 tbl. 1.2 (1994) [hereinafter BOOK
OF THE STATES] (cited in Baker, supra note 5, 60, at 143 n.2). Of course, requiring the smallest
possible percentage of voters to approve a measure may in some instances facilitate the enactment of
constitutional provisions favorable to a minority. Simple majority requirements were interpreted as
troublesome by some citizens in California who disapproved of measures designed to grant added legal
protections to homosexuals. Initiatives were placed on the ballot to require supermajority referenda
approval of any measures designed to prevent discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or HIV
status. See Comment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is There a Fundamental Right to
Participate in the Political Process, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 447 nn.6-7 (1994). A similar
municipal initiative in Riverside, California, was found unconstitutional by a California Court of
Appeals. Id., citing Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 648 (Ct. App.
1991).
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alter the state constitution.'
While constitutional amendment by a simple majority may subject minority
rights to the whim of the voting public,' the greatest danger exists in states
which provide for constitutional amendment by public initiative. When
amendments must originate or be approved by two-thirds of the legislature,67
they are less susceptible to majoritarian impulses.' Thirty-three states require
the approval of a two-thirds majority of each house of the legislature for any
constitutional amendment to be submitted to the public for ratification.69
Although legal, political, and psychological barriers decrease the likelihood of
amending a state constitution by initiative or other method to undo state
recognition of same-sex marriage,' the seventeen states which provide for
65. The seventeen states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South
Dakota. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 64, at 24 thl. 1.3.
66. For a discussion of constitutional revision by a simple majority as actually favoring the passage
of provisions protective of minority rights, see Baker, supra note 5, 60, at 155-58.
67. See generally BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 64.
68. It was for this reason that the founding fathers designed the federal government in the form of
a republic rather than a direct democracy. In Madison's view, a republican form of government would
"refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of
justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." David B. Magleby, Let
the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13,
20 (1995) (quoting James Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
69. Although public initiatives have proven to be susceptible to majoritarian expressions of
disapproval of minority lifestyles, particularly in the context of homosexual rights, relatively few such
measures have achieved success with the voters.
Initiative amendments statistically have a much lower likelihood of ratification than legislatively
proposed amendments. The approval rating for amendments stemming from the legislature has been
calculated to be between 47% and 69%, while the approval rating of initiative amendments has been
measured as between 21% and 48 %. These statistics stem from a study of eight states between 1898 and
1978. See DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 72 (1984) [hereinafter DIRECT LEGISLATION].
For a proposed amendment that was ratified by the public, see COLO. CONSr. art. II, §30(b)
(prohibiting state and its cities and counties from enacting any legislation designed to protect
homosexuals from discrimination or grant them rights on the basis of sexual orientation). For a similar
provision that failed, see STATE OF OREGON, OFFICIAL 1992 GENERAL VOTER'S PAMPHLET, MEASURE
No. 9 (preventing state or government subdivisions from granting protective status to homosexuals),
cited in Seth Hilton, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is There A Fundamental Right to
Participate in the Political Process?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 446 n.2 (discussing Oregon measure
and other antihomosexual initiatives on ballots in Idaho, Alachua County, Florida, and Maine and
indicating failure of such initiatives to make it onto ballot in Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Missouri,
Nevada, Ohio, and Washington).
70. See TIP H. ALLEN & COLEMAN B. RANsONE, JR., CONsrITUTIONAL REVISION IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 16 (1962). Political and legal barriers explain why amendments originating in the legislature
are less successful avenues for ratifying amendments harmful to the interests of a minority group. Id.
at 19-20. Common legal barriers against amendments include approval by a two-thirds majority of both
houses of the legislatures and approval by a majority of those voting in the election. A political barrier
may be "the tendency of individuals and groups afforded some special status or protection in the existing
constitution to oppose changes in the document." Id. at 16. Elected officials who observe the
mobilization of a strong special interest group become less likely to advocate the change. The voting
public may also be dissuaded from supporting the measure because the signals of community leaders
often direct the public vote. See ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES 49 (1975). Controversial
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direct public amendment of the constitution will be regarded as potentially
unfriendly sites for same-sex marriage litigation.
Although direct citizen initiative amendments have been shown to operate
against rights for alternative lifestyles, citizen initiatives have a much lower
passage rate than those with legislative origins."1 In states that require
legislative origins for amendments, the process is less susceptible to majori-
tarian impulses, such as a desire to circumvent judicial approval of same-sex
marriages. Furthermore, the single issue of same-sex marriage is unlikely to
mobilize voters to repeal state provisions banning gender discrimination even
if such provisions are found to guarantee a right of same-sex marriage. Finally,
a state judiciary could find a proposed constitutional amendment to violate
other constitutional provisions on several grounds. The passage of state
constitutional provisions circumscribing the rights of same-sex partners is not
likely to abridge substantive federal guarantees because federal equal
protection, privacy, and fundamental rights have not been interpreted to afford
guarantees for homosexuals.' However, particular amendments generally
designed to affect political liberties of gay and lesbian individuals may be
interpreted as impermissibly circumscribing a fundamental federal right to
political participation.73 A new amendment to ban same-sex marriage could
also conflict with a state constitutional provision barring discrimination on the
basis of sex.74 Thus, state and federal constitutional challenges could be made
against a proposed amendment designed to "overrule" a judicial recognition of
a right of same-sex marriage. In sum, the state constitutional amendment
amendments are thus more likely passed through the citizen initiative method existing in seventeen
states. In the states without citizen initiative amendments, the political and legal barriers are often too
substantial to ratify a proposal designed to limit the rights of a particular minority.
Even in states with citizen initiative constitutional amendments, psychological barriers can inhibit
constitutional revision, in that citizen voters generally recognize the significance of a proposed
constitutional change. DIRECr LEGISLATION, supra note 69, at 73 (commenting on decreased likelihood
of policy revision through constitutional amendment but noting its more secure legal standing). American
political culture believes that a constitution is superior to statutes and should, therefore, be harder to
revise. CORNWELL Er AL., supra, at 8. Political observers Tip Allen and Coleman Ransone have
observed "a tendency of [American] people to display romantic and almost reverent attitudes toward a
state constitution," and described such attitudes as "a significant impediment to reform." ALLEN &
RANSONE, supra, at 17. Measures that will substantially alter the policy of an existing provision face
the inertia of the status quo, making it difficult to pass the most controversial provisions. CORNWELL,
ET AL., supra, at 187.
Constitutional barriers also limit the revision of state documents. A constitutional amendment must
accord with other provisions of the state constitution as well as the federal Constitution. The
constitutional requirements for a valid amendment implicate the judiciary in monitoring the process,
especially when amendments are passed through citizen initiative. David Magleby has commented that
"[tihe courts play a vital role in the direct legislation process. They not only balance competing rights
and liberties but are the 'traffic cops' over the procedures and practices of direct legislation." Magleby,
supra note 68, at 46.
71. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
72. See discussion of federal rights, infra text accompanying notes 75-104.
73. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), and supra text accompanying note 38.
74. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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process need not dissuade legal strategists from arguing for a right of same-sex
marriage based on state sources. Recent judicial opinions demonstrate an
evolution in the jurisprudence of the right to marriage which promises eventual
recognition of same-sex unions anchored in state constitutional provisions.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CLAIMS
The right to privacy has been defined as the right not to have one's life
dictated by the state, which "exists because democracy must impose limits on
the extent of control and direction that the state exercises over the day to day
conduct of individual lives."75 This notion of privacy as a right of personal
autonomy in making choices about personal or family life free from coer-
cion76 carries the most importance for self-definition within society. It is not
clear, therefore, that the right is implicated where the state does not ban a
certain type of interpersonal relationship, but instead merely refuses to sanction
it by law.
Same-sex litigants desiring permission to marry are demanding that the state
assert its power over their lives in pronouncing them partners. Yet, a right of
privacy in marriage thus far applies only to existing legal marriages. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,7' Justice Douglas was especially concerned that
under the provisions of a law banning the use of birth control by both married
and unmarried couples, the police would be instructed to "search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives.""8
He commented, "[t]he very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship."7 9 In analyzing this opinion, Earl
Maltz concluded that "even viewed in isolation, Griswold cannot be viewed as
establishing a right to enter into marriage; instead, Justice Douglas' opinion
focused only on the special protection to be given to the interests of those
already married."'
Similarly, Loving v. Virginia8l cannot be read to establish a right based
in privacy to choose one's spouse without limitation. In Loving, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriage.
While Chief Justice Warren's opinion referred to marriage as "one of the
75. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 805 (1989).
76. John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Retrenchment:
Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived From Federal Sources, 1990 EMERGING
ISSUES IN STATE CONsr. L. 195, 199-200.
77. 381 U.S. 481 (1965).
78. Id. at 485-86.
79. Id.
80. Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Many: A Dissenting View, 60 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 949, 950 (1992).
81. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival,"'
the core holding of the case hinged on an equal protection, rather than a
fundamental rights analysis. The Court held that the ban on interracial
marriages was racial discrimination, and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Zablocki v. Redhail arguably established marriage as a fundamental
right, although the holding in this case was also based ultimately upon equal
protection. The statute at issue in Zablocki forbade marriage for residents who
were under court order to support minor children unless they proved they were
complying in all respects with the order. The Court held that the statute
violated equal protection. Justice Marshall asserted that
[b]y reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean
to suggest that every state regulation which regulates in any way to the incidents
of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the
contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. 4
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court conceded that there was in fact a
"fundamental character" to the right to marry,a8 but the fundamental character
of the right is within legitimate regulatory control of state laws so long as the
regulations meet the demands of equal protection. Conversely, same-sex
marriage litigants need.not prove a fundamental right to marry to establish
unequal state regulation as unconstitutional.
A. The 1970s Litigation
In the early 1970s, three challenges to bans on same-sex marriage were
brought in the states. All three claims were based wholly or partially on federal
law and all three failed to win a right of same-sex marriage. These cases
demonstrate that federal law does not support an absolute right to a marriage
of one's choosing.
In Baker v. Nelson,8 litigants failed to succeed with a two-pronged
argument asserting a fundamental right to marry and equal access to that right.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that denying an application for a marriage
license by two males was constitutional. As stated by the court, "Minn St. c.
517,1 which governs 'marriage,' employs that term as one of the common
usage, meaning the state of union between persons of the opposite sex."as The
82. Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
83. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
84. Id. at 386.
85. Id.
86. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
87. MI'N. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01-517.08 (1970).
88. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86 (citations omitted).
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court's opinion centered on the understanding that due process guarantees do
not authorize a court to reinterpret the meaning of marriage plainly conveyed
by legislation and accepted in society.s9 In soundly denying that petitioners
possessed a fundamental right to marry, the court concluded that denying
marriage licenses to same-sex couples did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining that "there is no irrational or
invidious discrimination .... 'Abstract symmetry' is not demanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. "9
In Jones v. Hallahan,9 petitioners claimed that the state's denial of a
marriage license deprived them of three basic constitutional rights: the right to
marry, the right of association, and the right of free exercise of religion.92
Much like the Minnesota court, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded
that, in the absence of gender-specific language in the statute, marriage "must
... be defined according to common usage . . . Appellants are prevented
from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal ... to issue
them a license, but rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage
as that term is defined."' In looking to traditional definitions of marriage, the
court found "no constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage
between persons of the same sex. " '
The Supreme Court of Washington decided the first marriage license case
in which both state and federal constitutional claims were asserted, and again
concluded that an equal protection argument attached to a fundamental right to
marriage could not succeed under current constitutional doctrine. In Singer v.
Hara,' the Washington Supreme Court held that the gender-neutral language
of the Washington marriage statutes, did not prima facie make same-sex
marriages permissible, 9 and banning such unions did not violate state9 or
89. Id. The court also noted that Griswold was inapposite for this case because it dealt only with
the privacy inherent in a state-sanctioned husband-wife relationship. Id. at 186.
90. Id. at 187. The court found this case fundamentally different than Loving v. Virginia, stating
that there was a "clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based
upon the fundamental difference in sex." Id. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court regarded the sex of
the applicants for the marriage license as the fundamental issue, not the nature of the right sought.
91. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
92. Petitioners also argued they had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. The court did
not discuss this argument or the freedom of religion claims at length, stating only that no constitutional
violation had taken place.
93. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d at 589, citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.020(4), 402.210
(Michie 1970). The court quoted numerous dictionary definitions of marriage limiting the relation to
male and female couples. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974).
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West 1961).
98. The court found that the current gender-neutral language of the statute was passed with the sole
intent to eliminate different age requirements for males and females to marry. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
at 1189. The court noted that the statute that referred to the affidavits required for the issuance of a
marriage license plainly referred to the "male" and the "female." Id.
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federal equal protection. Appellants argued that the intention of the recently
adopted state equal rights amendmentO° was to make sex an impermissible
legal classification. The court, however, asserted that the traditional under-
standing of marriage was a legal union between one man and one woman.101
Because marriage licenses were being equally denied to both homosexual men
and women, the state was not discriminating on the basis of sex.1°m The court
took an extremely limited view of the state equal rights amendment:
The ERA does not create any new rights or responsibilities ... It merely insures
that existing rights or responsibilities, or such rights and responsibilities that may
be created in the future, which previously might have been wholly or partially
denied to one sex or to the other, will be equally available to members of either
sex. 103
The Washington court, like the Minnesota and Kentucky courts before it,
decided against an equal protection argument predicated upon a fundamental
right of marriage.
The federal cases discussing a fundamental right of marriage and the three
challenges to the prohibition of marriage between same-sex couples in the
1970s together establish that the right of privacy, a right wholly concerned with
limitations on government power, does not compel government recognition of
marriage. The failure to perform marriages for same-sex couples does not deny
them the pleasure of personal relationships of their choosing. It simply fails to
award them state-sanctioned benefits." 4 Regardless of the arguably funda-
mental nature of the right to marry, a privacy argument for public proclamation
99. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3.
100. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1. ("Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not
be denied or abridged on account of sex.") The provision was approved by voters and became effective
December 7, 1972.
101. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191-92.
102. Id. at 1191. This argument paralleled that used by the Commonwealth of Virginia in Loving
v. Virginia: banning interracial marriages was not discriminatory on the basis of race because marriage
licenses for interracial couples were denied equally to whites and blacks. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 7 (1967). The Singer court rejected this similarity:
[A]Ithough appellants suggest an analogy between the racial classification involved
in Loving... and the alleged sexual classification involved in the case at bar, we
do not find such an analogy. The operative distinction lies in the relationship which
is described by the term 'marriage' itself... In Loving ... the parties were barred from
entering into the marriage relationship because of an impermissible racial classification. There
is no analogous sexual classification .... Appellants are not being denied entry into the
marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the
marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which
may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the opposite sex.
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1192.
103. Id. at 1194.
104. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, Concurring andDissenting Opinions, PuB. INTEREsr, 25-26
Winter (1971) (arguing that homosexual relations conducted in confines of bedroom must be protected
on grounds of privacy, but homosexual relationships do not warrant affirmative legal approval by the
state because such sanctioning would "intrude[ ] upon us all...").
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of marriage does not accord with the understanding of privacy as a limit upon
the proper power of the state.
State courts in the 1970s same-sex marriage cases concluded that plaintiffs
were denied access to marriage not because of who they were but because of
the nature of marriage itself. The state judges thus were able to skirt the more
difficult issues of the role of marriage in contemporary society and the level of
protection to which homosexuals desiring to engage in marriage were entitled
under equal protection doctrine.
B. Recent Opinions Eliciting New Promise
Two state courts have heard challenges to the prohibition of same-sex
marriages in the 1990s. 115 The Hawaii Supreme Court decided Baehr v.
Lewin and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals handed down Dean v.
District of Columbia. Neither opinion validated marriages between same-sex
partners, yet each demonstrated new approaches by state judiciaries in
evaluating these cases.
In Baehr v. Lewin,1  the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that banning
same-sex marriages under Hawaii law"° was subject to strict scrutiny
analysis based on the equal rights amendment in the state constitution."°' The
Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state equal protection clause was more
expansive than its federal counterpart.)19 It noted that the "power to regulate
105. Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is not a state court, it is termed such for
the purposes of this discussion because it fulfills the role of a state supreme court within the District.
The primary differences are the lack of multiple state legal sources and an independent state constitution
in which the court can ground its rulings.
106. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). For an indepth discussion of the reasoning of this opinion, see
Note, Baehr v. Lewin: Questionable Reasoning; Sound Judgment, 11J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
589 (1995) (agreeing with decision but arguing analysis unsound).
107. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (1988).
108. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 50; see HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5, "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws,
nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise
thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry." The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs'
argument that their state constitutional right of privacy was violated. The court recognized that it had
full power to expand the state constitution's right of privacy beyond federal standards, yet found no
reasonable basis for doing so. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-56. The language of the state constitutional right
to privacy was so similar to the federal right that "no 'purpose to lend talismanic effect' to abstract
phrases such as 'intimate decision' or 'personal autonomy' can 'be inferred from [article I, § 6] any
more than... from federal decisions." Id. at 57. Thus, the court concluded
[w]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and
collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.
Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed. Accordingly, we
hold that the applicant couples do not have a fundamental right to same-sex marriage arising
out of the right to privacy or otherwise.
Id.
109. Id. at 65-66.
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marriage is a sovereign function reserved exclusively to respective states." 11°
By depriving plaintiffs of the status of marriage because of their sex, the state
denied them a number of rights and benefits."' By its plain language, "the
Hawaii Constitution prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination against any person
in the exercise of his or her civil rights on the basis of sex.""'
As support for this principle, the court turned to a concurrence by Justice
Powell in the Supreme Court's decision in Frontiero v. Richardson,13 which
subjected sex-based classifications to strict judicial scrutiny. Later case law
lowered the level of protection for sex-based classifications to intermediate
scrutiny. However, in Justice Powell's concurrence in Fronliero, he argued that
the court need not establish sex-based classifications as suspect, because if the
Equal Rights Amendment then before the states were to pass, strict scrutiny
analysis would be applicable to gender-based discrimination. The Hawaii court
noted,
It]he Powel group's concurring opinion ... permits but one inference: had the
Equal Rights Amendment been incorporated into the United States Constitution, at
least seven members (and probably eight of the Frontiero Court) would have
subjected statutory sex-based classifications to "strict" judicial scrutiny." 4
The Hawaii court concluded that because a state-level equivalent of the Equal
Rights Amendment had been added to the state constitution, gender was subject
to strict scrutiny in the state of Hawaii. The court held that the marriage
statute, on its face, discriminated based on sex against the applicant couples in
the exercise of the civil right of marriage. 15 State regulation of marriage was
subject to constitutional restraints and the right to marry could be denied only
for compelling reasons.
116
In Dean v. District of Columbia,"7 the District of Columbia Court of
110. Id. at 58.
111. Id. at 59.
112. Id.
113. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
114. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
115. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. The court noted that Lewin's reliance on Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), failed to establish the scope of plaintiffs' rights because that case focused
only on federal claims. The court also noted that Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973), did
not address plaintiffs' claims because no questions of equal protection or state constitutional provisions
were raised by the plaintiffs in Jones. The Hawaii court cautioned against legal conclusions based upon
the.traditional definition of a relationship and noted that "constitutional law may mandate, like it or not,
that customs change with an evolving social order." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. Similarly, the Baehr court
rejected the Supreme Court of Washington's reasoning in Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974),
that appellants were not denied a marriage license because of their sex but because of the nature of
marriage itself. Id.
116. To overcome a presumption of unconstitutionality, the state must demonstrate that the denial
furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary abridgments of
constitutional rights. The case is set for trial in late 1996.
117. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995). The opinion of the court was per curiam and consisted of
only four lines. rd. at 308.
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Appeals held that the federal constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection had not been abridged by the District's banning of same-sex
marriages."' 8 Judge Ferren's fifty-six page opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part did, however, contain significant materials for future same-
sex marriage litigation.1 9 Ferren did not find a traditional right to same-sex
marriage to be fundamental or rooted in a privacy guarantee,"2 but, like the
Hawaii Supreme Court, he found that the proscription of same-sex marriage
implicated equal protection concerns.
Ferren's analysis centered on whether appellants' had been denied equal
protection.' Ferren concluded that a trial was necessary to determine
whether same-sex couples comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class, thereby
entitling them to either strict or intermediate scrutiny." He did not look to
sex-based classification but to sexual orientation classification. Ferren
suggested that homosexuals per se may be a protected group.'2
118. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia, the appellants'
Equal Protection claim stemmed from the Fifth Amendment.
119. Id. at 308-64.
120. Although the D.C. marriage statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-43, was expressed in neutral terms,
its language and legislative history demonstrated that same-sex marriages were intended to be prohibited.
Judge Ferren interpreted the term "marriage" in the statute in a traditional manner; he did not view
same-sex marriage as a fundamental right. Dean, 653 A.2d at 314 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 309.
122. Id. at 358. Two concurrences, however, relied on traditional views of marriage from the
1970s: "[If two people are incapable of being married because they are members of the same sex and
marriage requires two persons of opposite sexes.., then I do not see how it makes any difference that
the District of Columbia, or any agency of its government, discriminates against these two appellants
by refusing to allow them to enter into a legal status which the sameness of their gender prevents them
from entering in the first place." Id. at 361 (Terry, J., concurring). "Surely, if only opposite-sex
marriage is a fundamental right, the state may give separate recognition solely to that institution through
a marriage act as here." Id. at 364 (Steadman, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 325. One of the most innovative sections of Ferren's opinion is a discussion of the
fundamental difference between adjudicative and legislative facts. Ferren defined adjudicative facts as
those that describe the events that occurred between the relevant parties. Id. at 323. He stated that
legislative facts are "patterns of social, economic, political, or scientific behavior or other data that a
court inevitably uses to inform and shape the policy judgments it often has to make in deciding
newly-presented questions of law. " Id. at 324. The adjudicative facts are sufficient to dispose of the case
by summary judgment only if they answer a series of questions in a manner that precludes plaintiffs
from a judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Ferren asserted that certain questions of law had to
be answered before granting summary judgment to defendants, including whether members of the
allegedly protected class (homosexual couples) are entitled to greater constitutional protection against
discriminatory treatment than members of other groups, and, depending on the level of protection
required, whether the law has unfairly discriminated against members of the allegedly protected class.
Id. at 324.
This question brought Ferren back to the court's all-important role as a legislative fact-finder. Ferren
discussed the importance of determining legislative facts, social facts in particular, in deciding questions
of constitutional law. Id. at 324-25. Ferren noted that the legislative facts upon which judges rely are
often not immutable but change as society changes. Id. at 330. Thus, as societal attitudes regarding
homosexuality change, judicial determinations regarding the level of constitutional protection of
homosexuals as a class may alter. Ferren asserted that a finding that homosexuals comprise a
constitutionally protected class would not dictate the result in this case, but would simply determine the
burden of proof on the state to justify prohibition of homosexual marriages. Id. at 335.
To determine whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class for purposes of Equal Protection,
Same-Sex Marriages
With regard to the status of homosexuals under the equal protection clause,
Ferren stated, "I am not comfortable opining about a subject so elusive, and
so controversial, as to the nature, causes, preventability, and immutability of
homosexuality without benefit of a trial record with the right kind of expert
testimony, subject to cross-examination."" Ferren's opinion indicates a
trend in considering social and scientific data and evolving standards of
morality when determining whether same-sex relationships should be sanctioned
by the state.
V. TRENDS IN LITIGATION: MAKING THE PROPER CHALLENGE
The legal analysis of these cases indicates that the most promising elements
for future same-sex marriage litigation are claims based upon equal protection,
rather than a "fundamental" right of marriage, and challenges rooted in state
constitutional, rather than federal, provisions. State constitutional equal rights
amendments that bar discrimination based upon sex,lr 5 and state constitution-
Ferren concluded that the court must look to history of purposeful discrimination; presence of deep-
seated prejudice and stereotypes that do not reflect class members' abilities; presence of an immutable
trait that bears no relationship to individuals' abilities to contribute to society; and political
powerlessness. Id. at 344-51.
Judge Ferren concluded that "[d]iscrimination against homosexuals has been pervasive in both the
public and the private sectors." Id. at 344-45 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, I., concurring)). In finding that homosexual couples are subject to
debilitating stereotypes, Ferren offered many sources discussing the stereotype of promiscuity among
homosexuals that likely contributes to society's failure to recognize their commitments to personal
relationships. Id. at 345. Ferren concluded that the court must weigh current scientific evidence on
whether homosexuality is a genetic predisposition before determining whether homosexuality is an
immutable characteristic. Id. at 346. Ferren found that ample evidence existed to support the political
powerlessness of homosexuals, focusing on the discrimination that causes many lesbian and gay men
to hide their true sexual orientation. Id. at 349. Ferren noted that fact-finding judgments would also
include any compelling government interests in prohibiting same-sex marriage. Id. at 358.
124. Id. at 356.
125. Sixteen state constitutions contain an equal rights amendment. Some state constitutional
provisions list discrimination on the basis of sex alongside other impermissible bases such as race and
religion. Other provisions discuss sex-based discrimination in an independent section. The provisions
read as follows: "No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of race,
color, creed, sex or national origin." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; "Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of
sex." COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 29; "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be
subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political
rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability."
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
State on account of sex. The legislature shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this section." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3; also, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor be denied equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the
enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race,
religion, sex or ancestry." HAW. CONsr. art. I, § 5; "The equal protection of the laws shall not be
denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts."
ILL. CONSr. art. I, § 18; "In access to public areas, accommodations, and facilities, every person shall
be free from discrimination based on race, religion, or national ancestry, and from arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable discrimination based on age, sex, or physical condition." LA. CONSr. art. I, § 12;
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." MD. CONsr. art. 46;
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al privacy provisions that grant expansive individual autonomy are two of the
most important liberty guarantees upon which to base a claim.'2 State
supreme courts have found both such provisions to grant broader civil liberties
protections than their federal counterparts.
A. Unsuccessful Claims
The existence of a right of privacy in a state constitution may be an
important legal source in same-sex marriage litigation. In the past, challenges
to the proscription of same-sex marriages based upon a right to privacy27
failed because the privacy right did not establish a right to same-sex marriage
"Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national
origin." MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I; "The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account
of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas." MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 4; "[Elquality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account
of race, creed, color, sex or national origin." N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2; "[Elquality of rights under the
law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person." N.M. CONsr. art. II, § 18; "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of
the sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; "No otherwise qualified person shall, solely by
reason of race, gender, or handicap be subject to discrimination by the state, its agents or any person
or entity doing business with the state." R.I. CoNST. art. I, § 2; "Equality under the law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is
self-operative." TEX. CONSr. art. I, § 3a; "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not
be denied or abridged on account of sex." WASH. CONSr. art. XXXI, § 1; "Since equality in the
enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state
affecting the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex,
or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly
ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction." WYO. CONSr. art. I, § 3. Just as the Louisiana
provision grants protection only from "unreasonable" sex-based discrimination, the California provision
is limited to the business context. "A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a
business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic
origin." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8. This provision would offer little assistance to plaintiffs seeking
state-sanctioned same-sex marriage.
126. The five independent, enumerated privacy clauses in state constitutions read as follows: "The
right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement
this section." ALASKA CoNST. art. I, § 22; "All people are by their nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONSr. art.
I, § 1; "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his
private life except as otherwise provided herein." FLA. CONSr. art. I, § 23; "The right of the people
to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
The legislature shall take affirmative-steps to implement this right." HAW. CoNST. art. I, § 6; "The
right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
In addition, six other states include a right of privacy in a provision designed to limit searches and
seizures. These clauses are found in Arizona: art. 11, § 8; Hawaii: art. I, § 7: Illinois: art. I, § 6;
Louisiana: art. I, § 5; South Carolina: art. I, § 10; and Washington: art. I, § 7. Other state supreme
courts, including Kentucky and Tennessee, have found an implied or penumbral right of privacy in the
state constitution that is broader than the right implied at the federal level. Additionally, some states
protect a right of privacy by statute. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1993) (stating relief
for violation of recognized right to privacy).
127. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974).
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at the federal level. A federal right of privacy often included a privilege to
engage in personal or sexual relationships of one's own choosing, yet it did not
create an affirmative duty for the state to sanction personal alliances. Likewise,
a state constitution privacy clause does not create a duty to sanction same-sex
marriages. It may, however, compel respect for individual liberty and
autonomy in decision-making.
On the other hand, state laws that criminalize sodomy reflect a lack of
personal and relational autonomy. Currently, private and consensual sodomy
is criminalized in twenty-four states. With the recent decisions in Kentucky and
Tennessee, however, this number may more accurately be twenty-two. 128 The
mere existence of such statutes in a large number of states constitutes an initial
barrier to be overcome before same-sex marriages would be approved in those
jurisdictions.
The fundamental right to marriage claim, like the privacy claim, is unlikely
to achieve recognition of same-sex marriages. According to constitutional
jurisprudence, a fundamental right is one which is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.129 The notion of fundamental rights originated
with the right of privacy in Griswold.130 In that case, the Court described a
fundamental right as one which is "older than the Bill of Rights."13 1 In Palko
128. Private, consensual sodomy is a criminal offense in the following states: Alabama, ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1975); Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1978); Arkansas,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1984);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3505 (1974); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (1975) (declared unconstitutional
under state constitution privacy analysis in Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992));
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:89, 14:89.1 (West Supp. 1982); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 553-54 (Supp. 1982); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, 750.338,
750.388(a)-(b) (West 1981); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West Supp. 1982); Mississippi,
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1982); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1981); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1979); North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1981); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op.
1977); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982) (declared unconstitutional in Campbell v.
Sundquist, No. 93C-1547, slip op. (5th Cir. Ct. Tenn. Davidson County, Feb. 2, 1995) (order granting
summary judgment)); Texas TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1974); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-403 (1983); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1982). The statutes in Arkansas,
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, and Texas only criminalize sodomy between persons of the same
sex. It should additionally be noted that the District of Columbia criminalized private, consensual
sodomy between adults until 1993, when a repeal law was passed by the D.C. Council and signed by
then Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly. This occurred in May and was subject to a sixty-day review period by
Congress. Congress took no action and the law was repealed officially in September. In addition, it
should be noted that the Montana sodomy law was struck down by District Court Judge Jeffrey Sherlock
on February 16, 1996; however, the decision may be appealed by the state attorney general. See Big
Sky Victory, ADvoc., Apr. 2, 1996, at 14.
129. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990).
130. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 481, 486.
131. Id. A more exacting definition came from Justice Goldberg's concurrence. He stated that the
determination of whether a right is fundamental does not stem from "personal and private notions," but
from
the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principal is
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v. Connecticut,' "fundamental" rights were defined as "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."33 Under those definitions, same-sex marriage
does not pass the constitutional test.
The inapplicability of a "fundamental right" to same-sex marriage litigation
is further demonstrated by history. Historical tradition is an essential element
in finding a right to be fundamental, as is proof of its acceptance and exercise
by a large portion of American society. At this point in American history,
same-sex marriage meets neither of these tests. Even if one state court found
a right of same-sex marriage, it would not meet national constitutional
standards because fundamental rights require belief in, and exercise of, a right
by a large group of people across the nation.
As society's morality has evolved, its perception of the important elements
of marriage has changed greatly. The legal claim brought forth by plaintiffs
challenging the proscription of same-sex marriage should be one which stresses
change. Because marriage has been defined as fundamental for some couples
but not for others, the equal protection of the laws is implicated in the
changing status of the right.
B. The Promise of an Equal Protection Claim: Evolution of the Legal
Standard
Equal protection, as analyzed by a number of leading constitutional
scholars, may be the most effective tool to combat the denial of recognition of
homosexual relationships. According to Alexander Bickel, cities, states, and the
federal government must exercise
their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some
reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulations. This equality
is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should
not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. 34
Some states have argued that unequal protection of legal status is justified
given the nature of homosexuality. Governmental power is thus exerted to the
detriment of a minority on the grounds that it is reasonable. Such action must
be scrutinized under equal protection doctrine to determine whether, given the
'so rooted [Mere]... as to be ranked as fundamental.' ... The inquiry is whether a right
involved' is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.'
Id. at 493 (Goldberg, I., concurring) (citations omitted).
132. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
133. Id. at 325.




nature of the right, the differential treatment is reasonably warranted or
whether it is merely the product of unreasonable bias. Bickel thus described the
appropriate analysis under the equal protection doctrine:
[he balance of moral considerations and felt needs comes out in these instances
so as to forbid mere discriminatory choices, while, on the other hand, permitting
the legislature to take account of observable differences that relate rationally to
some independent purpose, which is itself permissible. 35
The determination of what constitutes a permissible end is thus at the heart of
equal protection analysis.
Cass Sunstein has commented on the significance of the Equal Protection
Clause,'36 paying particular attention to the evolving meaning of permissible
ends. For Sunstein, the Equal Protection Clause cuts directly at the legality of
classifications:
The function of the Clause is to prohibit unprincipled distributions of resources and
opportunities. Distributions are unprincipled when they are not an effort to serve
a public value, but reflect the view that it is intrinsically desirable to treat one
person better than another. 7
The Equal Protection Clause limits the government's ability to award benefits
only to certain groups of citizens. The basic requirement of equal protection
is that statutory classifications be related to valid social purposes in present
societal conditions.
By contrast, the Due Process Clause is designed to protect substantive,
often fundamental rights, and is therefore majoritarian and protective of
tradition:
[firom its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely (though
not exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-run departures. The
clause has therefore been associated with a particular conception ofjudicial review,
one that sees the courts as safeguards against novel developments brought about by
temporary majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history"
The Equal Protection Clause is, however, forward-looking and invalidates
longstanding traditions that are recognized as discriminatory in light of
changing times and increasing demands of certain groups for fair treat-
ment. 139
135. Id. at 226.
136. Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982
Sup. CT. REv. 127.
137. Id. at 128.
138. Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1988).
139. Id.
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The Equal Protection Clause ... has been understood as an attempt to protect
disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and
longstanding. The Due Process Clause often looks backward... [butIthe Equal
Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that were
widespread at the time of its ratification and that were expected to endure. 10
The ability of the Equal Protection Clause to adapt its standards to evolving
attitudes in society has also been emphasized by the Supreme Court. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,'4'
stated:
the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular
era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality... Notions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change...14 2
This forward-looking aspect of the Equal Protection Clause is a promising
ingredient for same-sex marriage litigation. The remaining question concerns
the level of equal protection analysis to be accorded to same-sex couples who
have been denied a marriage license. In states that have a state constitutional
provision barring discrimination along gender lines, precedent indicates that the
level of analysis is likely to be strict scrutiny. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 43
Justice Powell, the Chief Justice, and Justice Blackmun found it "unnecessary
for the Court. . . to characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the
far-reaching implications of such a holding,"'"4 because the question was to
be resolved with the pending passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. In
Baehr v. Lewin, 14' the Hawaii Supreme Court used similar reasoning in
concluding that the state constitution's equal rights amendment subjected sex
discrimination to strict scrutiny. An analysis of the contemporary status of
homosexuality under the law, however, demonstrates no current support for
strict scrutiny analysis of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.
140. Id.
141. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
142. Id. at 669-70.
143. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
144. Id. at 691-92.
145. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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C. Homosexuals as a Suspect Class
In order for the proscription of homosexual marriage to be analyzed under
an equal protection strict scrutiny test, homosexuals must be determined to
constitute a suspect class."4 As previously discussed, homosexual marriage
has not been recognized as a fundamental right at the federal or state level.147
Changes in society that have contributed to a better understanding of
homosexuality may, however, elevate homosexuals as a group to suspect class
status.
A review of suspect class status requirements reveals that strict scrutiny
may be applicable to homosexuals in light of evolving social conditions and
understandings. The five criteria deemed most important in the creation of
suspect class status have been enumerated as: (1) a long history of discrimina-
tion toward the class; (2) the possession by the class of a characteristic that
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society; (3) the mark of
a badge of distinction upon the class; (4) the relegation of the class to a
position of political powerlessness; and (5) the possession by the class of an
immutable characteristic that is either inherent or uncontrollable.'48 In order
for homosexuals to constitute a suspect class they must be found to meet all
five criteria.
The first is fairly easy to establish; a pattern of discrimination against
homosexuals has existed from Biblical days'49 to the modem workplace. 50
Under the second category, many members of the public argue that discrimina-
tion against homosexuals on the basis of their ability to contribute to society
is warranted because homosexual status allegedly projects a negative image of
an individual, decreasing their productivity, efficiency, and revenue.'
Courts analyzing the requirement of a badge of distinction have concluded that
homosexuality does not meet this standard, because it is behavioral rather than
visible.15 1 It has been asserted that homosexuals can hide their status and thus
evade discrimination. However, the longstanding practice of gays living closet
146. Homosexuals have repeatedly been denied suspect class status at the federal level. See Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust. See. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 127-133.
148. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973).
149. See Genesis 19:5; Leviticus 18:22, 20:13.
150. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 563 (holding Defense Department's policy of subjecting all
homosexual job applicants for secret and top secret clearance positions to expanded investigations and
mandatory adjudications did not violate Fifth Amendment Due Process); McConnell v. Anderson, 451
F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972) (holding it permissible for University of
Minnesota to reject avowed homosexual's application for librarian position).
151. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School District, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977) (finding schoolteacher's ability impaired by public displays of homosexuality regarded as immoral
by society).
152. See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 563.
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lifestyles to avoid discrimination has directly contributed to their political
powerlessness, the fourth criteria of suspect class status. Because of their
minority status, it is difficult for homosexuals to achieve equality of rights
through standard political processes. Grassroots support of gay rights seems
only to have been achieved in communities with a large number of gay
citizens.5 3 Only the increasing visibility of the gay community in recent
years has contributed power to the gay rights movement.154 Finally, the
immutable characteristic criterion presents the most difficult question because
it requires proof of the origin of homosexuality. If sexual orientation could be
scientifically proven to be genetic, it would be considered immutable. Opinion
in the scientific community is mixed at best, with the majority supporting a
social conditioning theory that incorporates a limited genetic predisposi-
tion."55 The lack of agreement in this area leaves the issue of scrutiny
unresolved.
The great promise for the eventual recognition of same-sex marriage lies
in Judge Ferren's opinion in Dean v. District of Columbia.156 He recognized
that some conclusion regarding the cause of homosexuality is required before
any more cases can be decided as a matter of law. While more individuals in
society are beginning to question whether homosexuality is a naturally
occurring biological condition, 57 the idea that sexual orientation does not
involve choice has hardly achieved consensus. Until this issue is decided,
homosexuals are unlikely to achieve suspect class status. As an alternative,
same-sex marriage litigants can attempt to achieve heightened scrutiny for their
claims by focusing on sex- rather than sexual orientation-based classifications.
State equal rights amendments prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex
currently offer gay rights activists their only hope for heightened scrutiny
analysis in same-sex marriage litigation.
D. The Equal Rights Amendment and Original Intent
As previously discussed, sex-based classifications receive only intermediate
scrutiny under federal doctrine. However, in their concurrence in Frontiero,
the Powell group wrote
153. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
154. 1988 census officials estimated that there were 1.6 million unmarried couples of the same-sex
living together. See Victor F. Zonana, Census Will Count 'Unmarried Partners'for First 77me, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1990, at A38.
155. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY, FINAL REPORT
AND BACKGROUND PAPERS 77 (1972). But for recent evolution in opinion regarding homosexuality, see
William Saletan & Nancy Watzman, Marcus Welby, J.D.: When Doctors Become Judges, NEW
REPuBLic, Apr. 17, 1989, at 21. The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from
the body of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual as a disease and placed it as a condition in a note in
the appendix. Id.
156. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995).
157. See Saletan & Watzman, supra note 155, at 21.
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There is another.. . reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifica-
tions as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights Amend-
ment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise question, has been
approved by Congress and submitted for ratification by the States. If the
Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will of the people accomplished
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. .... 158
The question remains as to whether such strict scrutiny of sex-based classifica-
tions would have been applicable to state marriage regulations.
During debates on the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, the issue of
same-sex marriage was raised by friends and foes of the provision. Some
concluded that the amendment would not affect the ban on same-sex marriage,
and others asserted that it would make the proscription of same-sex marriage
unconstitutional.1 59 Many opponents of the amendment asserted that same-sex
marriage would be constitutionally demanded with the passage of the
amendment. They intended these assertions to spark fear in the American
public and increase opposition to the amendment. ERA proponents initially
responded by endorsing homosexual rights and declaring that the ERA would
end discrimination against lesbians and gay men as well as against women
generally."6 This action led to a frenzy of controversy surrounding the
amendment and caused some would-be proponents of the measure to withdraw
their support.
As opponents continued to insist that the Equal Rights Amendment would
legalize homosexual marriages, proponents began strenuously denying that the
amendment would affect classifications within the institution of marriage.
Those supporting the amendment pointed to 1970s judicial decisions on the
issue, specifically Baker v. Nelson. They stressed that no fundamental right of
homosexual marriage existed in the federal Constitution and none would be
created by the amendment.' In an article urging citizens of Connecticut to
ratify the ERA, Yale Law Professor Thomas Emerson and associate Barbara
Lifton asserted that the amendment would not grant new rights to homosexuals.
158. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). See also BURT,
supra note 39, at 363; Note, The Legality of HomosexualMarriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 583-88 (1973)
[hereinafter Legality of Homosexual Marriage]. In commenting on the middle tier of judicial review
established by the Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), Burt states, "The Court had
invented something more than minimal but less than strict scrutiny: a 'middle tier.' If the Equal Rights
Amendment had been subsequently ratified, this jurisprudential innovation would no doubt have
disappeared .... " BURT, supra note 39, at 363.
159. See generally MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986); JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY
WE LoSr THE ERA (1986); Thomas Emerson & Barbara Lifton, Should the ERA Be Ratified?, 55
CoNN. BAR J. 227, 233 (1981).
160. See Legality of HomosexualMarriage, supra note 158. That Note argued that the ERA would
end all sex-based distinctions and would therefore legalize homosexual marriages since gender would
become a "'prohibited' rather than a 'suspect' classification." The Note was used by numerous parties
on both sides of the debate, although the Note authors claimed in subsequent interviews to have
espoused no particular view.
161. BERRY, supra note 159, at 89.
Yale Law & Policy Review
They wrote, "[t]he wording of the ERA and its legislative history make clear
that it would not legalize homosexual marriages or otherwise affect laws
dealing with homosexual couples. The ERA prohibits discrimination on account
of gender, not sexual preference."162 As further explained by Mary Frances
Berry,
the proponents of the amendment affirmed the view of the cases that prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex did not mean or imply prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual preference. In other words, if a state decided to legalize
marriages between men and men, it would be required to legalize marriages
between women and women, or vice versa. But otherwise the amendment would
have no effect on legalizing sexual preference. 163
Berry claimed that the amendment "had nothing to do with private conduct but
covered only actions by the government."" 6
The assertions made by ERA proponents against the amendment's
applicability to homosexual marriage suggest that the sex of the parties seeking
marriage should be overlooked if they are gay. This view discriminates against
homosexuals because it suggests that a gay man or lesbian is not entitled to the
same rights as a straight man or woman. In addition, Berry failed to recognize
that state action lay at the heart of the marriage issue because it was the
government which denied same-sex couples a marriage license. Proponents of
the Equal Rights Amendment abandoned the notion that the amendment would
have any effect on discrimination against homosexuals. The legislative history
and intended effect of the amendment on gay issues remains cloudy and
unresolved.
One question remaining is whether the original intent of the proposed
amendment should be a deciding factor in current interpretation of the state
provisions. The search for original intent of the failed Equal Rights Amend-
ment is particularly complex because the intentions of both its proponents and
opponents must be assessed, and as asserted by Alexander Bickel, "[legislative
motives are nearly always mixed and nearly never professed."165
A court evaluation of what amounts to a constitutionally impermissible
distinction on the basis of sex is not limited to the categories of impermissible
distinctions at the time of the provision's passage. Because of the uncertainty
of the original intent of the federal Equal Rights Amendment, the applicability
to same-sex marriage of a state equal rights amendment is best examined under
general equal protection principles. The guarantee of equal protection is the
constitutional right least anchored to original intent. As discussed above, both
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 9O.
165. LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 134, at 214.
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legal scholars and the Supreme Court have commented on the forward-looking
nature of the equal protection doctrine."
In addition, the judiciary may apply the equal protection of the laws even
if evolving attitudes in society are not yet shared by the majority. 7 The
courts may find a distinction impermissible under the equal protection doctrine
if a significant number of citizens, other than the judiciary, believe that the
distinction is wrongly drawn. Alexander Bickel's comments regarding the role
of the judiciary as a leader of opinion are particularly relevant in the context
of judicial examination of the prohibition of same-sex marriages. He asserted:
[Restricting] the Court... to declaring an existing national consensus... would
charge the Court with a function to which it is, of all our institutions, least suited.
Surely the political institutions are more fitted than the Court to find and express
an existing consensus... The Court should declare as law only such principles as
will-in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future-gain general assent.'
The Supreme Court assumed this role in both Brown v. Board of
Education'69 and Loving v. Virginia."° In each of these decisions, the
Court declared longstanding racial discriminatory practices unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and supported
the view of a minority of citizens."' New social conditions and understand-
ings indicated to the Court that racial distinctions had become unconstitutional.
In the category of same-sex marriage, numerous recent societal develop-
ments indicate that a significant portion of the American populace has come to
question sex-based distinctions for state recognition of marriages. Courts
increasingly uphold legal rights for same-sex partners." A growing number
of cities recognize domestic partnerships pursuant to executive order or
166. See supra text accompanying notes 134-142.
167. Thus, even if a majority of the voting public of a state were to pass a law banning the
recognition of same-sex marriages in their jurisdiction, as discussed by Dunlap, supra note 61, the state
judiciary could still establish recognition of same-sex marriage based on state constitutional materials.
Hawaii is the site of pending antimarriage legislation; however, such a law would not withstand strict
scrutiny analysis if no state compelling interest were recognized.
168. LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 134, at 239.
169. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
170. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
171. SeeALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1965) [hereinafter PoLmcs
AND THE WARREN COURT]. Bickel's discussion of reaction in the South to Brown illustrated that some
Southerners believed in desegregation but required the Court's pronouncement to legitimize their view.
Although the 1954 decision generally surprised officials and the public, "[m]oderate voices ...
remained quiet rather than incur risks by coming to the Court's support, because they relied on the
Court itself and on its authority to make the judgment effective." Id. at 10. Bickel also stressed the
necessity of having public support for the ruling to be implemented successfully. Bickel wrote, "the
federal government will have to induce rather than coerce, to help rather than do." Id. at 38.
172. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). See also one of the earliest
cases upholding rights between same-sex partners, Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80, 85 (1980)
(holding that constructive trust exists in homosexual relationship and court of equity could not deny
relief to person merely because he was homosexual).
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municipal ordinance. Antimarriage statutes have been defeated or withdrawn
in a number of state legislatures. 17 Public opinion has also become more
supportive of gay rights in general. 74 State courts can cite all of these recent
developments as signs that a right of same-sex marriage will soon gain general
assent. As explained by Alexander Bickel, circumstances demonstrating a
developing opinion in society provide the courts with an opportunity to
anticipate society's changing view.75 Evolving opinion on the issue of
same-sex marriage makes it a topic ripe for judicial resolution.
State constitutional provisions prohibiting sex-based discrimination modeled
after the federal Equal Rights Amendment do not require that no distinctions
be drawn on the basis of sex, but simply subject all such distinctions to strict
scrutiny.76 As discussed above, the reasons for the distinction must be
supported by a compelling state interest achieved through narrowly tailored
means.'77 The court's evaluation of the state interest and the manner through
which it is achieved is balanced against the hardships allegedly created by the
distinction. Under an equal protection analysis, the evolving standards of
society should affect the court's determination of the appropriateness of the line
173. The bills were proposed following the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The states in which such a bill was defeated, withdrawn, or killed in the
legislature include Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Wolfson, supra note 61. In addition, a similar measure in
Colorado was vetoed by Governor Ray Romer. See Valerie Richardson, Governor of Colorado Rejects
Ban on Same-Sex Marriages: RomerAgainst Such Unions But Wants Panel to Study Bill, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1996, at A3. Governor Romer expressed special concern for discrimination against same-sex
couples under current law. Id. Romer referred to the anti-marriage law as "mean-spirited and
unnecessary." Id. Support for same-sex marriage was also evidenced in Hawaii where, in December
1995, a commission appointed by the governor recommended that the legislature recognize same-sex
marriages. See David W. Dunlap, Panel Endorses Same-Sex Marriages, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 11, 1995,
at A6.
174. The percentage of Americans who find homosexuality to be an acceptable lifestyle has risen
consistently over the past 14 years, from 34% in 1982, to 38% in 1992, to 44% in 1996. ADVOCATE,
Apr. 30, 1996, at 14 (citing USA Today/CNN poll); see also Job Rights for Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1992, at 10. Seventy-eight percent of Americans favor equal employment opportunities for
homosexuals and 66% support inheritance rights and health insurance for gay partners. Id. In a public
opinion poll of 800 voters conducted in May of 1995, 42 % stated that civil rights for gays and lesbians
are more akin to equal rights, while only 38% declared that they are more akin to special rights. In
addition, 74% of the voters polled stated that they favored preventing job discrimination against gay
people. Marriage-The Toughest Battle Lies Ahead, supra note 35, at 16.
175. LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 134, at 239. In addition, the states in which
legislation to bar recognition of same-sex marriages is currently pending cannot yet be viewed as hostile
sites for gay and lesbian unions. The states with laws still pending consist of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
and Tennessee. The majority of the anti-marriage laws were proposed by conservative factions which
do not necessarily represent a majoritarian consensus. Dunlap, supra note 61, at A13; see also Wolfson,
supra note 61. Proponents of same-sex marriages should watch these states closely to see whether the
legislation passes, and if it does pass, by what margin. The simple proposition of legislation by persons
opposed to same-sex marriage does not undo the support for the right found in other provisions of state
law, including the state constitution, and among the public. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335
(Colo. 1994) and text accompanying note 36-38.
176. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
177. See supra notes 106-116 and accompanying text.
Same-Sex Marriages
drawn by the state. In the context of same-sex marriage, the supreme courts in
states with a constitutional ban on sex-based discrimination should consider the
changes in public opinion manifested in polls and judicial decisions in
determining whether state interests in prohibiting same-sex marriage are
compelling. In so doing, the judiciary would anticipate developing societal
opinion on the issue of same-sex marriage rather than substitute its own
opinions or delay until a national consensus of opinion existed.
Because the original intent of the Equal Rights Amendment remains
unclear, it is not determinative of the provision's applicability to the context of
same-sex marriage. However, the general purpose behind the provision makes
developing social acceptance relevant to the court's interpretation of the
constitutionality of the prohibition of same-sex marriages.
E. Analyzing State Interests
Because litigation founded on a state equal rights amendment claim would
result in a strict scrutiny analysis, it is helpful to review and analyze the state
interests that would be offered to justify bans on same-sex marriage. State
interests presented in litigation since the 1970s have been based upon three
fundamental arguments: (1) same-sex marriage is inconsistent with nature,
history, and/or the essence of marriage; (2) same-sex marriage is contrary to
community values and traditional moral teachings; and (3) same-sex marriage
would disrupt settled expectations about the purposes of marriage, such as
family-centered procreation. 171 Such arguments are far less likely to succeed
under strict scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny.
One of the most common arguments against same-sex marriage is that
marriage is understood to provide an appropriate family unit for procreation
and the rearing of children. 179 It may be rational in light of such a purpose
to disallow same-sex unions because procreation itself cannot occur in same-sex
marriages, and children are less likely to be found in such unions. However,
numerous homosexuals have children by previous heterosexual relation-
ships."8 In fact, a significant number of children in America are being raised
by a homosexual parent.181 Furthermore, there is no requirement that
178. See William N. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1493
(1993).
179. See A More Perfect Union, supra note 32, at 1181.
180. In one study of homosexual couples, 52% of homosexual men and 56% of homosexual women
had at one time had a child. ALAN BELL & MARTIN WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUA-iTlE: A STUDY OF
DIVERSrrY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 391, tbl 17.13 (1978).
181. Increasing numbers of jurisdictions allow second-parent adoptions by the same-sex partner of
a child's biological or adoptive parent. States allowing such adoptions include Alaska, California,
District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Vermont. TmE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND
GAY MEN 117 n.128 (Nan Hunter et al. eds., 1992).
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heterosexual couples be capable or desirous of reproduction." Heterosexual
couples may enter into marriage and choose to remain childless. Thus, the
state's interest in marriage as a procreative family unit has a weak connection
to the denial of same-sex marriage. It is fraught with moral judgments unlikely
to withstand a strict scrutiny challenge.
Additionally, a state cannot assert that the denial of homosexual unions will
foster heterosexual ones because no proof exists that homosexuals can be
"cured" of their sexual orientation. It has been noted that generally, "[h]omo-
sexuals will not reorient their affectional preference and marry a person of the
other gender. " " Thus the denial of same-sex marriages by law in no way
serves a state interest in fostering heterosexual unions.
Supporting public morality has also been advanced as an objective. Courts
have often been receptive to this claim."s However, public morality is
constantly evolving. It has been observed that "premarital and extramarital sex
were once considered immoral, [yet today] a majority of Americans no longer
considers sex outside of marriage inherently immoral. " 1" Similarly, there has
been an increasing acceptance of homosexuality."8 6 Americans may begin
wondering whether it is more moral to deny same-sex unions marital status or
to make the commitment between same-sex partners binding and recognized by
law. Indeed the encouragement of marriage of same-sex couples may in fact
serve public morality. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the state's concern for
public morality is not achieved through denying same-sex marriages.
A number of the purposes asserted for state regulation of marriage actually
favor the recognition of same-sex unions under a compelling interest test. The
promotion of stability, the protection of the reasonable expectations of the
parties, and the promotion of physical and emotional health,e 7 are equally
applicable to homosexual and heterosexual partners. These factors are
important to an individual's quality of life regardless of their sexual orientation.
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, marriage should be granted to all who seek it
because it arguably contributes to an individual's well-being as well as societal
182. See, e.g., Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (1948) (holding that inability to
procreate cannot be grounds for preventing heterosexual marriage).
183. Cathy Jones, The Rights to Marry and Divorce:A New Look at Some Unanswered Questions,
63 WASH. U. L.Q. 577, 622 (1985).
184. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) ("The law... is constantly based on notions
of morality.").
185. A More Perfect Union, supra note 32, at 1183 n.94 (citing study that percentage of Americans
disapproving premarital sex has declined from 68% in 1973 to 39% in 1985).
186. See, e.g., Congress Lets Sodomy Pass, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 19, 1993, at A7. Congress
declined an opportunity to override a District of Columbia municipal ordinance ending the
criminalization of sodomy. Sodomy had been illegal in the capital since 1790. See also LESBIANS, GAY
MEN AND THE LAW 87 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993). In 1961, sodomy was illegal in all 50 states
and the District of Columbia. Today 24 states have sodomy statutes on the books, two of which have
been declared unconstitutional by the states' judiciaries.




The only remaining arguments for limiting marriage to heterosexual
partners are based upon traditional definitions. The way a term has historically
been interpreted or understood is less relevant under an equal protection
analysis in light of the forward-looking nature of the right.18 Equal protec-
tion analysis incorporates evolving standards in society; this is especially true
under the strict scrutiny test. Current societal conditions, including the AIDS
crisis and an evolution in public morality, have changed the definitions of
marriage and relationships in general for many Americans. A test under an
equal rights amendment would not uphold a denial of marriage under circular
arguments such as the definition of the institution or the traditional understand-
ing of the relationship. Under strict scrutiny analysis, moralistic and historical
arguments would fail because they do not achieve the threshold of a compelling
interest served by the least restrictive means.
F. Additional Factors of Import
A few additional state elements add strength to claims for recognition of
same-sex marriage. As previously discussed, a respect for personal autonomy
in a state may be evidenced by the existence of a privacy provision in that
state's constitution.8 9 Such respect also may be indicated by the absence of
a law criminalizing sodomy in a state, or by a state supreme court which has
declared such a law unconstitutional."9 In addition to tangible elements in a
given jurisdiction, certain intangible judicial and political trends should be
added to an analysis of the likelihood of a given state supreme court recogniz-
ing a right of same-sex marriage. While the holdings of a state supreme court
are dependent upon the law of the state, the manner in which the court
interprets the laws is affected by these intangible characteristics. Such trends
shall be referred to as judicial and political culture. The judicial and political
culture of a given state are highly relevant to the likelihood that the courts of
a jurisdiction will recognize a right of same-sex marriage based on state legal
materials.
Because the judiciary exists in the context of the larger state political
system, its views on policy are affected by surrounding political actors. The
political culture of a state has been defined as the "particular pattern of
orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded." 9
188. See supra text accompanying notes 136-142.
189. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
190. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Campbell v. Sundquist, No. 93C-
1547 slip. op. (5th Cir. Ct. Tenn. Davidson County 1995) (order granting summary judgment).
191. DANIEL 1. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEw FROM THE STATES 109 (3d ed. 1984)
(quoted in G. ALAN TARR & MARY C. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 55
(1988)).
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Political culture is an important source in explaining the different habits,
perspectives, and attitudes that influence political life in the states. 192 Political
scientist Daniel Elazar has identified and defined three major strains of political
culture in the states: individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic. 97
The individualistic political culture operates under the model of democracy
as a marketplace. This cultural strain is found most commonly in the middle
sections of the country.194 Individual freedom is, in general, the cornerstone
of the individualistic political culture. Societies subscribing to it are likely to
value minority interests in areas such as personal autonomy. In fact, Elazar
asserts that the individualistic political culture has "provided the framework for
the integration of diverse groups into the mainstream of American life."" 9
This political culture holds the most promise for a validation of same-sex
marriages.
The moralistic political culture differs from the individualistic in that its
operative model for democratic government is a commonwealth. The moralistic
strain is found primarily in the far North, Northwest, and Pacific Coast."9
In this culture, politics is considered "one of the greatest activities of humanity
in its search for the good society- a struggle for power, it is true, but also an
effort to exercise power for the betterment of the commonwealth. " 197 The
moralistic political culture fosters a greater commitment to active government
intervention in the economic and social life of the community.' The role of
the supreme court in a state with a prevalent moralistic culture could be an
activist one, but the direction of its policy would vary depending upon the local
population's changing definition of the "good society." Thus, in cities like
Berkeley and San Francisco, gay political activists and the prevalence of AIDS
helped convince fellow citizens that recognition and stabilization of same-sex
relationships promoted the good society. Therefore, campaigns for recognition
of gay rights were successful at the grass-roots level. In addition, it should be
noted that Colorado, the state of the liberal Evans v. Romer 99 opinion, has
192. Id. at 110.
193. Id. at 115. Each culture is strongly tied to a particular section of the country, although precise
measurements for a particular area are difficult. Many states exhibit characteristics of more than one
political culture, and invisible regional boundaries, as opposed to state boundaries, often dictate where
one cultural strain ends and another begins.
194. Id. at 134. Government in individualistic societies serves strictly utilitarian purposes, generally
granting its constituents what they demand. Politics is viewed as a means by which individuals may
improve themselves socially and economically, but is also seen as a dirty business, best left to
professionals willing to soil themselves by engaging in it. The effect of this type of political culture on
a court is somewhat dependent upon the agenda of the public and the type of justices on the court. Id.
195. Id. at 142.
196. Id. at 134.
197. Id. at 117.
198. Id. at 118.
199. 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
Vol. 14:237, 1996
Same-Sex Marriages
been noted to exhibit a moralistic political culture.' °
The traditionalistic political culture stems from "an ambivalent attitude
toward the marketplace coupled with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the
commonwealth."" This culture is dominant in the states of the South. Under
the traditional strain, a society tends to accept hierarchy as part of the ordered
nature of things, and the purpose of government is generally considered to be
maintenance of the existing social order. It is the least likely to validate
same-sex marriages because new liberties are seldom created in regions
subscribing to traditionalistic culture.
While the legal resources of a state are indispensable in planning litigation
for same-sex marriage, targeting a state court which favors judicial innovation
is also important. It has been hypothesized that innovation is likely in states
with social and political diversity and political competition because they rank
high in conflict. Conflict creates a heightened awareness and responsiveness to
new social issues.= Therefore, a general tendency for judicial innovation is
more likely in states with urbanism, a high total state population, a solid
educational system, and a stratified system of wealth. In addition, certain
political characteristics including high government capability, a previous
tendency to innovate, financial support, professionalism, and an active
two-party system, increase the likelihood of state supreme court innova-
tion.' Thus, a state exhibiting these characteristics is more likely to house
a state supreme court willing to experiment in validating same-sex marriage.
Legal culture is also an element of the larger state political context, but is
related to a court's views about its proper policymaking role. The legal culture
is defined as "the norms and expectations that govern the legal process in the
state and guide the behavior of participants in the process."' The political
culture of a state significantly influences its legal culture. As a political
institution, the state judiciary tends to reflect "subcultural differences within the
200. ELAZAR, supra note 191, at 118.
201. Id.
202. See HENRY R. GLCI, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
JUDICIAL ROLE 174 (1971).
203. See Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to STATE SUPREME COURTS:
POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM viii (Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Tar eds., 1982).
204. TARR & PORTER, supra note 191, at 58.
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state's overall political culture."' As explained by Henry Glick,
For state supreme courts ... judges have expectations concerning what constitutes
proper behavior on their part toward individuals who occupy other positions and
... the incumbents of these positions also have expectations regarding what judges
should and should not do. The interactions taking place between judges and those
in counter-positions linked to the court define the judge's role.1
The legal culture determines the degree to which the state judges believe legal
differences of opinion must be resolved by the courts and whether the justices
on the state's high bench conceive of their roles as ones in which policy is
made or in which "hands on" policymaking should be avoided.' The
judiciaries of states with innovative, active legal cultures are the state benches
most likely to recognize a right of same-sex marriage."°8
VI. THE NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE COURT APPROVAL OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Before targeting future sites for same-sex marriage litigation, a brief
assessment must be made regarding the significance of success in a single
state.' Two factors that must be considered in the course of such analysis
are choice of laws and sister court influence. Each is a factor in a state's
treatment of same-sex marriage in light of its own policy and its respect for the
policy of other states. The role of the judiciary as a leader of opinion must also
be assessed.
205. Porter & Tarr, supra note 203, at viii.
206. GLicK, supra note 202, at 7.
207. Political scientist G. Alan Tarr has identified three separate role orientations for state supreme
court justices: law interpreters, law makers, and pragmatists. Law interpreters view the judicial role to
be somewhat passive in that it is completely limited by the constraints of the written text. Law makers
are activist judges, construing a textual provision to conform to their policy agenda or the overall spirit
which they wish to advance. Pragmatists blend passivity and activism depending upon the particular case
before the court. On some issues, pragmatists hand down activist decisions, while on others they
subscribe to a more passive reading of the law. Many state supreme courts have justices representing
all three different role orientations. However, the legal culture of some areas creates a prevalence of one
type of justice on the court. In comparing courts, Tarr found a prevalence of law interpreters in the
South with its traditionalistic political culture. The Mid-Atlantic region has the largest percentage of
lawmakers on state benches. Lawmakers in this region were also accompanied by a large number of
pragmatists, the single largest group of judges found across the nation. Therefore, with respect to legal
culture, the Mid-Atlantic region is home to the largest number of judges who might be willing to
innovate and create a right for same-sex marriage in their state. G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND
STATE SUPREME COURTS 5 (1977).
208. This observation holds true for states that currently have pending anti-gay legislation..
209. For a more thorough analysis of these issues, see Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism
and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 786 (1995);
Joseph Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L, REV. 450 (1994); Candace L. Sage, Note, Sister-State





Marriage is an area of human life specifically within the scope of state
regulatory powers. Each state has the right to determine who shall be eligible
to enter into marriage within its borders as long as such regulation follows
constitutional mandates. If one state were to hold that its constitution
guaranteed same-sex couples a right to marry, other states would have to
determine whether the union would be recognized within their own borders.
The traditional state rule for determining the validity of a marriage
performed elsewhere is to rely upon the laws of the state in which it was
performed. 10 Two exceptions exist to this general rule. The first exception
occurs when the state statute explicitly expresses that the general validation rule
is not to apply in other states if the marriage violates their laws. A marriage
can also be held invalid in another state if it violates that state's strongly held
public policy as declared in the legal materials of the state."' Thus, if
same-sex partners are married in a state that finds same-sex marriages
constitutional, they may be unable to retain their married status if they move
to another jurisdiction. If the new state either bans same-sex marriages within
its jurisdiction or declares that same-sex marriages performed in the home state
violate the new state's laws, the couple will be unable to retain its married
status in the new state. The potential obstacles to same-sex marriage are
demonstrated by the anti-same-sex marriage legislation currently pending in
many jurisdictions.212
A small number of states have enacted provisions which specify that
marriages performed in other states that violate their laws will not be
recognized. Although rarely codified, thirteen states currently have such
Marriage Evasion Acts. 1  They were originally designed to prevent the
inhabitants of these states from circumventing the marriage laws of their home
jurisdiction by going to another for the sole purpose of getting married. Thus,
if same-sex marriages continue to be denied in these states and are not held to
be required by the federal Constitution, homosexual partners residing in one
of these thirteen states will not be able to obtain a valid marriage in another
jurisdiction and retain their marital status upon returning to their home state.
However, such Marriage Evasion Statutes would be held unconstitutional by
210. Hovermill, supra note 209, at 454; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNFLicT OF LAWS
§ 283 (1971) ("A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized [subject to exception] as valid.").
211. Hovermill, supra note 209, at 455.
212. See Dunlap, supra note 61, at A13.
213. These states are Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
Closen & Heise, supra note 20, at 813-14 n.9. Further provisions are pending. See Dunlap, supra note
61, at A13; Wolfson, supra note 61.
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a state judiciary which held the state constitution to guarantee a right to same-
sex marriage. This is particularly true if the right is anchored in an equal rights
amendment subjecting sex-based distinctions to strict scrutiny. As explained by
David Dunlap, the pending legislation was proposed by conservatives who "see
themselves in a fundamental crusade to preserve the traditional family structure
as it has been understood through history."21 Such arguments based upon
history and tradition cannot withstand constitutional analysis under strict
scrutiny.
The public policy exemption could be applied to other states ff it were
established that same-sex marriages violated the state's social and moral
standards. A state's public policy is expressed in its court decisions, constitu-
tion and legislation. A state could not simply refuse to recognize such
marriages; the state's legal materials would have to establish that same-sex
marriages explicitly violate its public policy. Joseph Hovermill has explained,
"[a] foreign law is not contrary to a state's public policy merely because the
state has not legislated on the matter." 215 These sources must prove that
validation of same-sex marriages would violate state policy. Thus, states that
criminalize sodomy, explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage, or house state
courts that have specifically declared there to be no right to same-sex marriage,
could refuse to validate same-sex marriages on grounds of public policy.216
At this time, a majority of states have not enacted evasion statutes,
specifically legislated or ruled against the existence of same-sex marriage, or
criminalized sodomy.217 The question of whether these states would recognize
same-sex marriages performed in another jurisdiction would hinge on whether
autonomy or sister state comity is a more valued policy in the state. If neither
an evasion statute nor any clear public policy demonstrates that same-sex
marriages should not be approved, a state may be forced to recognize such
unions under the Full Faith and Credit or Equal Protection Clauses.218
214. Dunlap, supra note 61, at A13.
215. Hovermill, supra note 209, at 456.
216. In any state that passes a currently pending law banning recognition of same-sex marriages
within the jurisdiction, recognition would be refused on the grounds of public policy.
217. Despite the legislation pending in many states that would prohibit recognition of same-sex
marriages, such measures have only passed in Utah and South Dakota. Dunlap, supra note 61, at A13.
The end result in the other states remains unclear, "[it is too early to predict how many of the measures
precluding same-sex marriages will be passed .... The conflict in many statehouses will be fierce."
Id.
218. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other state."); U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[I'or
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also Hovermill, supra note
209. For an indepth discussion of the effect that the Full Faith and Credit clause would have on
interstate recognition of same-sex marriages, see Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage?
Constitutional and Choice ofLaw Argumentsfor Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 SrAN. L. REV.
499 (1995) (arguing that constitutional underpinnings of a national right to same-sex marriage are Full
Faith and Credit Clause, right of interstate travel, and fundamental right of marriage).
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It can be inferred that once one state recognizes and performs same-sex
marriages, others will follow. Horizontal judicial federalism, or sister state
court influence, can lead courts to similar results as their neighboring states.
This influence is fairly common due to the orientation toward precedent
inherent in the American legal system. Reliance upon other state supreme court
rulings lends support to legal principles. Regional influence has long been
exhibited in the borrowing of precedent, with state courts most often citing
opinions contained in the same West regional reporter as those of their own
state.2"9 Sister court reliance has become more common with the increased
activity of the state courts. An example of such regional sister court influence
was the Tennessee opinion in Campbell v. Sundquist,'0 invalidating that
state's laws against sodomy and quoting the Kentucky opinion in Common-
wealth v. Wsson. 2
If one state validated same-sex marriages, some neighboring states may
recognize the marriages performed in that state within their own jurisdictions;
others may sanction marriages between same-sex partners within their own
borders. Such has been the recent trend of independent state court legal action
coupled with sister state court influence. However, the evasion statutes and
public policy of some jurisdictions indicate that same-sex marriages would not
necessarily become valid nationally. This likelihood is further lessened by the
large number of states in which anti-gay marriage statutes are currently
pending. To achieve widespread approval, a federal right to marry someone of
the same sex would have to be established. At present, the achievement of a
federal right is unlikely. The greatest hope for litigants seeking a right of
same-sex marriage is for a decision in their favor in a state supreme court.
After recognition in one state, a national trend may become more viable and
contribute to federal recognition.
B. Power and the Judiciary
Although this Note focuses on the role and significance of the judiciary in
the legal battle for same-sex marriages, the importance of the other branches
in the ultimate achievement of the right should be briefly discussed. In order
for same-sex couples effectively to gain recognition of a right to engage in
marriage, the right must not only be proclaimed by the judiciary but must also
be enforced by the other branches of government in the state.m A court
219. TARR & PORTER, supra note 191, at 32.
220. No. 93C-1547 (5th Cir. Ct. Tenn. Davidson County 1995) (order granting summary
judgment).
221. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
222. Examples of promise for legislative and executive enforcement of a right to same-sex marriage
are state legislatures that have defeated or tabled the proposed antimarriage laws and Colorado Governor
Roy Romer's veto of that state's proposed anti-marriage bill. See supra note 173.
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decision declaring that the prohibition of same-sex marriage violates an equal
rights amendment is only the first step in establishing a right to marriage not
divided along lines of gender. A decision establishing a right of same-sex
marriage would be significant only if the opinion is put into practice by the
state. Interaction between the branches of government is thus necessary to
effectuate a constitutional claim for same-sex unions.
In equal protection litigation under a strict scrutiny analysis, such as that
which would be used to invalidate a ban on same-sex marriage in a state with
an equal rights amendment, a vital interaction occurs between the judiciary and
the legislature. The strict scrutiny requirement of a compelling state interest
achieved through the least restrictive means affords the government, particular-
ly the legislature, an opportunity to present a court with the purpose and intent
behind legislation. The judiciary then must assess the competing interests and
the links between interests and policy. State supreme courts have the discretion
to remand a case to a lower court to reinitiate the process. The possible
interaction between the branches of state government under a strict scrutiny
analysis would allow a period of consensus-building vital to the achievement
of a right as controversial as that of same-sex marriage. Interaction also gains
exposure for the issue and affords an opportunity for the public at large to join
in the debate. Support must be created in both branches of government and the
public at large for a judicial pronouncement of a right of same-sex marriage to
be effectuated in the states.' In the words of Alexander Bickel, "The [c]ourt
is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not
merely impose its own. . . .. 4
The importance of the judiciary entering into a colloquy with the legislature
is presently of heightened importance given the large number of states with
pending legislation that would hinder recognition of same-sex marriages. Bickel
indicated that the desirable colloquy can result from narrow statutory
construction by the courts in which the judiciary asks the legislature explicitly
to address the intentions and consequences of a statute or policy.' Burt
discussed the colloquy in the context of equal protection analysis, noting the
value of middle-level scrutiny because of the dialogue it facilitates between the
courts and the other branches of government. Whereas the rational basis test
nearly always validates legislation and strict scrutiny virtually always
invalidates it, middle-level scrutiny affords an opportunity for real input from
all of the parties involved and allows a more comprehensive, careful
223. For a full discussion of the failure to resolve an issue when adequate support is not achieved
among the branches of government or the public, see POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note
171, at 3-45 (in school desegregation context); BURT, supra note 39, at 357-68 (in abortion litigation
context).
224. LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 134, at 239.
225. BURT, supra note 39, at 361-62.
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assessment by the court.' This level of scrutiny could be used either by
state courts that disagreed with the Hawaii Supreme Court's conclusion about
the level of scrutiny demanded by a state equal rights amendment, or in states
that lack a constitutional provision banning sex-based discrimination. Burt
explained:
[Tihe two-tiered judicial review was never an opening conversational gambit from
Court to legislature; it was always the final word from the Court. EMliddle level
scrutiny is admirably suited in many different contexts as a technique ... for
promoting interchange between court and legislature. The question is, then, how
a court should recognize the appropriate contexts for applying these techniques.
There is a short answer to this question: all disputes which are so polarized that one
party regards the other's victory as destructive of equal status and therefore
intolerably oppressive. 7
The circumstances Burt identified would perfectly describe litigation over the
prohibition of same-sex marriage in states lacking an equal rights amendment.
However, middle-level scrutiny may not be effective in achieving initial
recognition of same-sex marriages. State interests based largely on tradition or
morality would most likely be deemed "important" under middle- level scrutiny
given the universal acceptance that gender is functionally and visibly
distinctive. Only under strict scrutiny can circular arguments based upon
history and morality be exposed as unsupportive of the ban. The essence of
what Burt describes, however, is exactly the process in which the courts should
engage to resolve the issue in the least divisive manner. The polarization of the
opposing parties in same-sex marriage litigation requires consensus-building
and limited judicial intervention.
Burt's general comments on judicial vindication of the equality principle
demonstrate that limited judicial intervention is, in fact, possible even under the
strict scrutiny analysis of a state equal rights amendment. Burt described the
model for resolving questions of equality as
a particularistic, carefully limited intervention encircled by a boldly stated moral
condemnation of majority disrespect toward a vulnerable minority .... The
equality principle itself demands particularistic, contextually circumscribed,
tentatively offered judicial interventions, as opposed to grandstyle moral philosophi-
sizing in the interpretationist mode, or agnostic surrender to majority will.m
Even under the strict scrutiny requirement of a tight link between alleged
state interests and a ban on same-sex marriage, interplay can occur between
different branches of government. The state supreme court must simply be
226. Id. at 362.
227. Id. at 362, 365.
228. Id. at 367-68. Burt goes on to suggest that the Supreme Court should have followed this model
when deciding Bowers v. Hardwick.
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willing to establish the proper level of scrutiny for the challenge and remand
the case to the lower courts for a determination of compelling interests.
The decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin 9 is an
example for other state courts that may encounter the same-sex marriage issue
in coming years. The court reached a circumscribed, tentative conclusion in
declaring that the state constitutional amendment barring discrimination based
upon sex brought the ban on same-sex marriage under the rubric of strict
scrutiny. Rather than reaching a final resolution of the issue, it remanded the
case to the lower court to afford the state an opportunity to reassess and
reassert the interests forwarded as compelling to justify the ban.u3° The
remand created an opportunity for an appropriate colloquy between the parties
to develop. The dialogue can be continued until the case is again appealed to
the state supreme court where a final decision will be handed down after an
adequate period of discussion. Although this process may not allow speedy
resolution and affirmation of constitutional rights, more importantly it creates
a binding, enforceable, and carefully reached judgment.
C. A Combined Analysis: Targeting Future Litigation
Proponents of same-sex marriage can examine state legal sources and
characteristics to determine the likelihood of successful future litigation. As
explained previously, claims based on state law stand a greater chance of
success than those based on federal law. The factors identified in this Note as
relevant to a successful challenge to a state proscription of marriage are:
absence of a sodomy law; a privacy amendment in the state constitution; an
equal rights amendment in the state constitution; an individualistic or moralistic
political culture; an activist legal culture; a diverse population; and absence of
a process for creating state constitutional amendments by direct citizen
initiative. An ideal target for same-sex marriage litigation would exhibit some
combination of these elements. The state factors pinpoint relevant characteris-
tics because Hawaii, site of Baehr v. Lewin, exhibits great promise under this
analysis.
The first category, states that do not criminalize sodomy, is the largest
group displaying any of the desirable characteristics. Twenty-eight states and
the District of Columbia either do not have a statute criminalizing sodomy, or
have a state court that has declared the statute to be unconstitutional."
229. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
230. Id.
231. States that do not criminalize sodomy or in which such criminalization has been found
unconstitutional are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,




States that have a privacy provision in their state constitution are smaller
in number. The five states with explicit privacy guarantees are Alaska,
California, Florida, Hawaii, and Montana. Both Florida and Montana
criminalize sodomy, however, illustrating that certain privacy rights may not
apply to homosexuals. Other states, however, such as Tennessee and Kentucky,
have interpreted their state constitutions to contain an implicit right to privacy,
more extensive than the federal right, in striking down a state sodomy law.
Therefore, the lack of an explicit respect for individual privacy may not be
fatal under the right political and judicial conditions.
The most important of the state characteristics, the existence of an equal
rights amendment in the state constitution barring discrimination on the basis
of sex, is found in sixteen states. 2 However, the Louisiana equal rights
amendment bars only "unreasonable" discrimination based upon sex.
Restricting marriage to heterosexual couples may be argued to be reasonable
under current law. In addition, sodomy is criminalized in Louisiana. Ten of the
states that bar discrimination based on sex do not criminalize sodomy. These
are: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming. Alaska
and Hawaii also offer explicit privacy guarantees, and Illinois and Washington
guarantee some privacy protection in the context of illegal searches. 3
Finally, an analysis of the states in light of intangible characteristics must
be undertaken. I use Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, and Washington as model states
because of their constitutional protections of privacy and prohibitions against
sex-based discrimination, as well as their demonstrated respect for individual
sexual autonomy in not criminalizing sodomy. 4
The previous discussion of political culture established that areas exhibiting
an individualistic or moralistic culture are most likely to declare a right to
same-sex marriage. Individualistic political culture exists primarily in the
middle sections of the country, while moralistic culture predominates in the
North, Northwest, and Pacific. According to Daniel Elazar, Illinois and
Washington exhibit strains of both individualism and moralism;15 Hawaii
exhibits strains of individualism tinged with traditionalism;" and Alaska
generally adheres to individualistic politics 37 All of these states except
232. See supra note 125.
233. See supra note 126.
234. I use these states as sites for analysis of possible recognition of same-sex marriages despite
the fact that Alaska, Hawaii, and Illinois currently have legislation pending which would deny
recognition to same-sex unions. Dunlap, supra note 61, atA13. Such measures have not yet been passed
in any of these states, and even if they were to pass, they could not withstand a constitutional challenge
under strict scrutiny. The state constitutional provisions of the five potential sites hold great promise for
judicial recognition of same-sex unions anchored in state constitutional provisions.
235. ELAZAR, supra note 191, at 118.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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Illinois have exhibited respect for individual autonomy, making a recognition
of gay rights in these areas a distinct possibility. Interestingly, no state
exhibiting a traditionalistic culture, regarded as the least likely to approve of
same-sex marriages, has passed the analysis to this level.
The legal culture of the states is more ambiguous. In a ranking of legal
professionalism conducted by Henry Robert Glick and Kenneth Vines in the
mid-1970s," 8 Illinois, Hawaii, Alaska, and Washington all ranked very high
in legal professionalism. This indicates that the judicial role and function is
taken seriously in these states and is viewed as an appropriate arena for conflict
resolution. Interestingly, Colorado, the home of the liberal Evans opinion that
overturned the popularly passed constitutional amendment prohibiting protected
status based upon sexual orientation, also ranked high. 9 Only Hawaii has
evidenced a strong trend toward innovation in its opinion in Baehr. None of
these states exists in a part of the country recognized as having a large number
of activist judges. However, the Pacific Coast is an area which has diverged
from federal interpretations in the years of new judicial federalism, tending to
illustrate the existence of pragmatists on the state courts of that region."
Finally, because diversity tends to produce respect for alternative lifestyles,
and urban areas have been found to contain the largest population of
homosexual individuals, the courts in states with large cities and diverse
populations are more likely to be responsive to challenges to discrimination
against gay citizens. Of the aforementioned states, Illinois and Washington have
the largest urban centers. In addition, Seattle, Washington has enacted a
domestic partnership ordinance, indicating a recognition in at least one part of
the state of the need to grant rights to homosexual partners. Cities in the other
states under analysis have enacted no such measures.
Washington also appears to be a better target for same-sex marriage
litigation than Illinois because its state constitution cannot be amended by
citizen initiative. In Illinois, proposed constitutional amendments can be ratified
through a public vote without ever being deliberated or approved by the
238. Although this study was conducted approximately twenty years ago, it still carries import for
the purposes of this analysis because it traces certain fundamental characteristics that have been existed
in various regions since the founding of the nation.
239. HENRY R. GucK & KENNETH VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 12 (1973). Illinois ranked third
nationally. Alaska tied with Michigan at sixth. Hawaii tied with Maryland at eight. Colorado and
Washington shared position eleven with Wisconsin. The index of legal professionalism was based on
five factors in the state court systems: (1) method of selection of judges in all state courts, with states
complying to ABA model plans of selection receiving the highest scores; (2) state court organization and
approximation to ABA model court structure; (3) judicial administration in the state, with states whose
courts had a professional administrator receiving a higher score; (4) tenure of office for judges and
approximation to ABA standards; and (5) level of basic salary for judges and approximation to ABA
standards. Id. at 11.
240. See, e.g., Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, in VIEWS
FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTrUTIONAL POI.TICS 237 (Mark W. Cannon & David
M. O'Brien eds., 1985).
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legislature. In Washington, ratification of a constitutional amendment requires
approval of a supermajority of both houses of the state legislature and approval
of a majority of voters. A previous analysis of state constitutional amendment
methods demonstrated that direct citizen initiative amendments pose a greater
danger of the public "overruling" a judicial decision recognizing same-sex
marriage than amendments that must be approved by the legislature.241
Therefore, judicial recognition of a right of same-sex marriage is more secure
in a state such as Washington which does not afford the public the opportunity
of constitutional amendment by initiative. In addition, the Washington
legislature rejected the anti-marriage bill proposed in that state, while a similar
provision is still pending in Illinois. The tabling of the anti-marriage bill offers
evidence of a willingness to support potential judicial recognition of same-sex
marriages by the other branches of government in Washington.
Through our analysis, Washington appears to be an ideal site for future
challenges to proscription of same-sex marriage. Although similar litigation
failed in the 1970s, changes in social attitudes about homosexuals and an
increased reliance on and independent interpretation of state legal materials
make a more liberal decision likely in the 1990s. Tracking characteristics and
planning future litigation may be more madness than method, however, because
each state in our federal system is a combination of numerous different, and
often conflicting, political and legal elements. A similar analysis to target sites
for challenging statutes criminalizing sodomy would not have pinpointed
Kentucky or Tennessee as potential states for such challenges. An in-depth
study of public opinion, legal views of the judiciary, and legal resources within
a state must be undertaken before future litigation can be planned which would
promise real success for achieving a right to marry for same-sex couples.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The proscription of same-sex marriage is an issue which is particularly
difficult to resolve in a binding manner through constitutional litigation. Public
opinion is strongly divided, with parties on both sides viewing victory as
essential in maintaining their respective lifestyles. This Note has presented a
view of the best legal claims to be made by parties seeking to validate same-sex
marriages, including equal protection claims brought in the state courts based
upon state constitutional amendments barring sex discrimination. It has put
forth and analyzed a number of state characteristics which increase the
likelihood that a state court will resolve the same-sex marriage issue in a
manner favorable to homosexual partners. Also presented, and requiring
further emphasis, is the fact that a mere judicial pronouncement based upon
241. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
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constitutional principles will not bring about tolerance of alternative lifestyles
or protection of minority interests. The state courts must effectively fulfill the
role of consensus-builder and leader of opinion, a role traditionally viewed as
appropriate for the United States Supreme Court in resolving issues of equality.
Only through cooperation with the other branches of government can a state
judiciary resolve the same-sex marriage issue in a manner protective of the
interests of both the minority and the majority.
